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With the continuous development of telecommunications, networking and the ubiquitous 
computing the necessity of higher bandwidth and better quality of services is always one of 
the most important user requirements. In this background, IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) 
is becoming very important for the Next Generation Networking (NGN) and all-Internet 
Protocol (all-IP) infrastructure. This new tendency provides opportunities for new operators 
and service providers to enter the market and to be competitive.  These developments will 
generate new challenges related to the user identity assurance.  It will be more difficult to 
rely on the old paradigms of the static operator relationships guaranteeing end-to-end the 
identity of the users. In this case there is crucial need to find new mechanisms to provide to 
the end points assurance about the identity of their counterparts. 
In this work we implemented a solution that establishes a trust between two end points 
by taking advantage of IMS in a roaming scenario where the visited access network may 
not be entirely trustworthy.  In essence, this means establishing an identity association so 
that the parties can have operator provided assurance regarding the used identities. This 
allows  local  trust  decisions  and  does  not  rely  on  the  existence  of  global  Public  Key  
Infrastructure (PKI). 
Concretely in this work we have modified the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
“INVITE” messages by adding new SIP headers such as the identity and the signature of the 
SIP entities taking part  in a multimedia conversation. Every SIP entity has to add its  own 
identity  and  signature  and  also  has  to  verify  those  of  its  counterparts  in  a  typical  SIP  
“INVITE” exchange.  
By this work we show that establishing this kind of identity association is feasible but 
some scalability issues have to be taken into account such as the time delay or the size of 
the new messages. In order to accomplish this master thesis work, we have used the Open 
Source IMS Core (OSIMS) platform developed by FOKUS, SailFin project as the 
Application Server (AS) and IMS Communicator as the IMS client.   
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays, we are at a real turning point in the history of networks. During a long time the 
different networks used to individually develop on their own, while now is the time for the 
convergence. This tendency logically arose to follow the users growing requirements. They 
demand access to any service, anywhere and at any time with the same user experience. As 
it is becoming possible to interconnect heterogeneous networks, the market is becoming 
very open and allows almost everybody to provide access services of their own. This leads 
to  the  increase  of  the  amount  of  mini-operators,  and  affects  the  development  of  new  
ubiquitous networks. In such a diverse environment, the security needs to be revised. 
Indeed, the operator relationships will not be anymore based on pre-established roaming 
agreements but they will be more likely to be dynamically generated. In this future context, 
the security requirements and in particular, the identities of the users and statements are 
becoming even more critical. 
Still, it can be envisaged that users trust their own operators who provide authentication 
procedures for them through secured infrastructures and billing services. It can be 
envisaged that in the future networks, the relationships between users and their own 
operators would remain trusted. In this case, users’ identity would be provided by their 
operator. In order to increase their revenues and to develop their customers’ loyalty by 
providing more profitable multimedia services, the operators invest a lot in new solutions. 
For example, as the next step of the Third Generation (3G), Ip Multimedia Subsystem 
(IMS) possibilities are carefully studied. 
In  this  project,  we  envisage  a  solution  that  takes  advantage  of  IMS  architecture  in  a  
roaming scenario to signal the needed identity parameters between two communication 
endpoints that rely on their own operators to establish their trust evaluation. In other words, 
we propose to establish an identity association so that the operators can provide assurance 
regarding the used identities, in a scenario where the visited access network may not be 
entirely trustworthy. It is assumed that the users trust their own operators and that the home 
operators  of  the  users  are  linked  with  a  roaming agreement.  It  is  also  assumed that  every  
entity is in possession of a secure cryptographic identifier. This one enables to justify of 
one’s identity by providing a proof of possession. This solution does not rely on the 
existence of global Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and is based on local trust decisions. 
Thus, in essence, this work proposes to use IMS infrastructure to carry the necessary 
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signaling needed to establish a call between two end points, visiting not entirely 
trustworthy networks.  
This thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter we will introduce the theoretical 
background related to this work. Notions such as IMS, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and 
principles of cryptography will be presented and explained in details. We will deal with the 
security problems of IMS technology and a mechanism to improve it will be presented.    
In  the  third  chapter  we  will  present  the  software  environment  that  we  have  used  and  
some important tools. We will explain the installation and configuration of the Open Source 
IMS Core and the integration of SailFin as an Application Server (AS). We will explain the 
configuration in the case of one IMS domain and in the case of two IMS domains. This part 
will be finished by testing and analyzing via Wireshark a  simple  call  between  two  IMS  
clients. Firstly, the clients are registered at the same domain and in a second time they are 
registered in two different IMS domains.  
The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the implementation of our solution that will be 
based on the development of an IMS client open source code and then on the development 
of a SIP application based on the SIP Servlet technology that will be deployed on the SIP 
application server. We will describe the classes and the methods developed in order to 
implement  the  mechanism  presented.  In  the  fifth  chapter  we  will  discuss  the  results  and  
present some improvements and future work on the topic. And finally, the sixth chapter will 
conclude the work and present some future work recommendations.  
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2 Theoretical background 
In this chapter we will present general overview of the background technologies that we 
have used in this thesis. We will introduce the theoretical part of these technologies and in 
some occasions we will explain in more details those subjects that have been needed for the 
comprehension of the topic and for the implementation of the project. After a short 
introduction to the paradigms of the communications networks over the last years, we will 
deal with the introduction of IMS, the architecture and its components. The security 
challenges of IMS will be introduce later and some technical mechanisms to correct them 
will be presented. As the last part of this chapter we will expose some key notions that have 
been very useful during the project such as the SIP protocol and the structure of the SIP 
messages, SIP Servlet technology and the general principles of cryptography.    
2.1 Evolution of mobile networks 
Since they appeared, the mobile telecommunication technologies have always known a 
continuous and fast growth. International Telecommunication Union (ITU) even admits 
that it has been the “most rapidly adopted technology in history” and that “it is today the 
most popular and widespread personal technology on the planet” [1]. With over one billion 
users worldwide, the cellular technology has become the most important part of 
communication in business and general public use. As a consequence, to answer to the 
growing customers demands, the wireless telephone technology was developed quite 
rapidly through its different generations. Each generation was marked by a decisive 
evolution enabling higher data rates, the use of new frequency bands and non-backwards 
compatible transmission technologies. The second generation (2G) technologies proposed 
circuit-switched voice (with the well-known Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM)) and packet-switched data (introduced by the General Packet Radio Service 
(GPRS)). The 3G marked a turning point by adding the packet-switching for the voice and 
data IP to the existing 2G infrastructures. By adding the rapidity of IP packet transmissions 
to the everywhere virtually coverage provided by the mobile phones infrastructures, the 3G 
enabled the emergence of broadband services with consistent user experience.  
Supported by the technology Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), 
the 3G was developed by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project collaboration (3GPP) 
standardization body. The 3G is based on a mixed core network using circuit and packet 
switched technologies. It increases bit rates in downlink and uplink, offers a fast access to 
Internet which enables to provide new multimedia services such as Mobile Television and 
Video on Demand [2]. All these new services introduced by the 3G were significantly 
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adopted by the costumers which resulted in a dramatic increase in data traffics as shown in 
Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1. Data traffic: 3G/3G+ vs. 2G [3] 
This data traffic was so important that new standards still had to be developed. Indeed, 
in  spite  of  the  good  performance  of  the  3G,  users  still  asked  for  more  services,  with  the  
same Quality  of  Service  (QoS),  regardless  the  network  they  are  attached  to.   It  is  in  this  
perspective that nowadays, the 3GPP develops the NGN, working in collaboration with 
some other organizations like: 
x The NGN group in Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) 
x The Telecoms & Internet converged Services & Protocols for Advanced Networks 
(TISPAN) group in European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)  
The approaching 4G mobile communication systems aim at solving the still remaining 
problems in 3G networks and at providing new services. The 4G, a network of networks 
which provides seamless service to mobile users anywhere, at anytime, is “a must” so far.  
The 4G architecture separates the Application Network (AN) and the Core Network (CN) 
and focuses on seamlessly integrating the existing wireless technologies including GSM 
and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN). The future 4G infrastructures will be 
composed of a set of various networks using IP as a common protocol. NGNs are defined 
not only to be multiservice, multiprotocol, multi-access, IP-based networks, but also 
secured, reliable and trusted. [4] 
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2.2 Introduction to IMS and its components 
In order to offer higher bandwidths, lower operational costs and new generation of services, 
wireless standards organizations are focused on building the next generation all-IP network 
infrastructure.  The IMS was created as a key part of the third generation network to solve 
these needs. It was introduced during the 3G development, in UMTS release 5. In its first 
version, the objective was to “support applications involving multiple media components 
per session in such a way that the network would be able to dissociate different flows with 
potentially different QoS characteristics associated to the multimedia session.” [4]. IMS 
was  later  extended  by  the  ETSI,  during  its  work  on  the  NGN,  the  4G.  Indeed,  IMS  was  
standardized  as  a  subsystem  of  NGNs  by  TISPAN.   The  Figure  2-2 shows a simplified 
view of the architecture proposed by IMS. We can distinguish the main functions and nodes 
that will be better presented in the General Overview of IMS section.  
 
Figure 2-2. Simplified IMS architecture [5] 
The IMS consists in a set of new entities dedicated to the handling of the signaling and 
user traffic flows related to the multimedia applications. All IMS entities are located in the 
IMS Core Network. According to the standards, IMS is defined in the form of reference 
architecture to enable delivery of next-generation communication services of voice, data, 
video, wireless, and mobility over an IP network [6]. It exists as part of an entire network. 
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IMS by itself needs others components such as an access network to complete its 
functionalities as a system for multimedia service delivery. 
2.2.1 Why do we need IMS? 
Nowadays, it is possible to access via a mobile phone any internet services. This is possible 
due to the development of wireless technologies and the available higher data rates 
available. The evolution from circuit-switched domain to packet-switched domain improves 
the user experience in Internet services access through the cellular network. So the 
question, “why do we need IMS for?”, still remains. According to [7], some of the reasons 
why we need IMS are: 
x One  of  the  most  important  reasons  is  the  Quality  of  Service  (QoS).  This  is  very  
important in real time multimedia sessions. The packet-switched domain provides 
best effort service without really considering QoS. Although IP networks have had 
their own QoS mechanisms with DiffServ and IntServ. Consequently, it might 
become a nightmare for users who want to use Voice Over IP (VoIP) or other real 
time services. Therefore, one of the reasons for creating the IMS was to provide the 
QoS required for enjoying rather than suffering real time multimedia sessions. 
x Another reason for creating IMS was to charge multimedia sessions appropriately. 
Generally in a network without IMS, 3G operators have no possibility to know what 
kind of service the user is using. 
x The third main reason is to provide integrated services. IMS offers the possibility 
for 3G operators to provide to the users their own services but also other services 
provided by third parties. The operators can integrate or combine these third party 
services to their own services in order to offer completely new services to users 
In other words, the IMS aims to [7]: 
x combine the latest trends to technology 
x make the mobile Internet paradigm come true 
x create a common platform to develop diverse multimedia services 
x create a mechanism to boost margins due to extra usage of mobile packet-switched 
networks 
There are some requirements that led to design of the 3GPP IMS [7]: 
x support for establishing IP Multimedia Sessions 
x support for a mechanism to negotiate QoS 
x support for interworking with the Internet and circuit-switched networks 
x support for roaming 
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x support for strong control imposed by the operator with respect to the services 
delivered to the end-user 
x support for rapid service creation without requiring standardization 
 
Figure 2-3. Access Networks Independence [8] 
As shown in the Figure 2-3, another very attractive characteristic of IMS is the access 
network independency. This means that telecommunication operators can integrate IMS in 
their network independently of the access network they are providing to theirs users, e.g., 
GPRS, UMTS or Long Term Evolution (LTE). IMS can even be integrated with wired 
networks  such  as  Cable  Networks,  x  Digital  Subscriber  Line  (xDSL)  or  Public  Switched  
Telephone Network (PSTN). 
2.2.2 General overview of IMS components 
First of all, we have to keep in mind that 3GPP standardize functions instead of nodes. This 
means that the IMS architecture is a collection of functions linked by standardized 
interfaces [7]. Depending on the operator implementation, we can find two or more 
functions into a single node or one function into two or more nodes.  For a closer view of 
the IMS architecture standardized by 3GPP, have a look at the Figure 2-4. 
In this figure we can distinguish different logical components, interfaces and networks. 
On the left side, there are different IMS terminals such as Personal Digital Assistants 
(PDAs)  or  computers  that  can  be  used  as  IMS  clients.  These  devices  referred  as  User  
Equipments (UE) can be connected to the IMS core network via wired or wireless access 
networks such as Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), GPRS, UMTS, etc. In the 
IMS Core  Network  we have  different  SIP  servers,  databases  and  gateways  through other  
networks. 
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Figure 2-4. IMS architecture [7] 
Figure 2-4 shows all the nodes included in the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem. 
These nodes are [7]: 
x One or more user databases called Home Subscriber Servers (HSS) and Subscriber 
Location Functions (SLF) 
x One or more SIP Servers known as Call Session Control Functions (CSCF) 
x One or more Application Servers (Ass)  
x One or more Media Resources Functions (MRFs), each one further divided into 
Media Resources Function Controllers (MRFCs) and Media Resources Function 
Processors (MRFPs) 
x One or more Breakout Gateway Control Functions (BGCFs) 
x One  or  more  PSTN  gateways,  each  one  decomposed  into  a  Signaling  Gateway  
(SGW) 
In this thesis we were more interested in some of these nodes. We will introduce their 
role  in  the  next  sections.  Fortunately,  one  does  not  need  to  be  expert  in  all  the  nodes  in  
order to install the platform and develop applications. The other nodes which are less 
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important for the project will not be introduced in this work. The reader can find more 
information in [7]. 
2.2.3 User identity in IMS 
Identification is one of the most important abilities of a network. Users have to be identified 
in any kind of network, such as when calls can be directed to the appropriate user. IMS also 
has  its  own way to  identify  users.  In  IMS,  there  are  two key  notions  concerning  the  user  
identity. These are the Private User Identity and the Public User Identity. 
Private User Identity 
Each IMS subscriber has one Private User Identity.  The  Private  User  Identity  takes  the  
format of NAI (Network Access Identifier) 
username@operator.com. 
The Private User Identity is used for subscription identification and authentication. It is 
stored in a smart card and there is no need for the user to know it. 
Public User Identity 
Each IMS user can be allocated one or more Public User Identity,  which is used to route 
SIP signaling in IMS. The Public User Identity can be a SIP URI or a TEL URI. If Public 
User Identity is a SIP URI, the form is as follow:  
sip: first.last@operator.com 
When a PSTN subscriber makes a call to IMS terminal or receives a call from IMS 
user, the TEL URI is always needed, because the identification in PSTN can only be 
presented as numbers. So, TEL URI uses an international way to present a phone number. 
2.2.4 The user databases: the HSS and the SLF 
The HSS is the main user database of IMS. It is used to store the authentication information 
of users and subscription-related information also known as user profiles. Technically, the 
HSS is an evolution of the Home Location Register (HLR). A network may contain more 
than one HSS, but in any case, all of the data related to a particular user is stored in a single 
HSS. In the Figure 2-5 the reader can find a schematic representation of the HSS. 
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Figure 2-5. Information in the HSS [6] 
The HSS supports the CSCF functions by [6]: 
x identifying the address of the CSCF that should be handling the session 
x storing the user’s registration and location information 
x supporting the authentication and authorization by providing the integrity and 
ciphering keys 
x providing an access to a service profile, for which the subscriber has been 
provisioned 
If multiple HSSs are used in the network, a SLF is needed. This is a database used to 
map the users’ address to HSSs. Both the HSS and the SLF can implement the DIAMETER 
protocol which is used to exchange AAA-related information [9]. The HSS and the SLF are 
always located in the home network.  
User Profile 
All the data related to a user are stored in the HSS in a data structure called user profile. 
The Figure 2-6 shows the components of this structure. The Private User Identity and one 
or more service profiles are stored in the user profile. Each service profile contains one or 
more Public User Identities and zero or more initial Filter Criteria (iFC). The user profile 
contains information about the media types that the user is authorized to use, and about the 
services  that  are  to  be  applied  to  the  user.  This  is  about  the  application  servers  that  will  
need to be contacted whenever the user issues a request. 
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Figure 2-6. User Profile 
When the user registers to a particular Serving CSCF (S-CSCF) and the authentication 
is confirmed, the user profile including the iFC is downloaded from the HSS by the S-
CSCF and is available for the whole period that the user is registered.  
Initial Filter Criteria 
Besides other information, in the service profile there is also initial Filter Criteria. It 
contains user information that indicates the S-CSCF when to involve a particular 
Application Server to provide the service. Filter Criteria is a very important concept in IMS 
because it determines the services that will be provided to each user. An iFC defines a set 
of conditions that, when met, will force the S-CSCF to delegate the control to an AS whose 
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is also part of the iFC. The conditions can be based on 
different combinations of values of SIP methods, SIP headers and so forth, present in the 
incoming request. For more information on SIP the reader can refer to the section 2.3. 
The iFCs are always evaluated with SIP initial requests that initiate a dialog or are 
stand-alone requests like ”INVITE”, “REGISTER”, “SUBSCRIBE MESSAGE”. Subsequent 
messages like “BYE”, “NOTIFY, “INVITE” inside a dialog are not evaluated. The iFC can 
be considered as the grouping between a Trigger Point (the logical expression of Service 
Point Triggers (SPT) matching a message) and an AS [10]. It is composed of groups and 
each  group  is  formed  of  the  logical  atoms,  the  SPT.  There  are  5  distinct  types  of  SPTs,  
based on what each of them is used to check in the SIP message: 
x Request-URI equals <value> 
x SIP Method equals <value> 
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x SIP Header matches <regular expression> 
x Session Case is one of [originating, terminating, terminating to unregistered user] 
x SDP Line [<line name>] matches <regular expression> 
 
Figure 2-7. Initial Filter Criteria 
The components of an iFC are presented in the Figure 2-7. As we note, the iFC is 
composed  by  one  or  more  Service  Point  Trigger  and  some  fields  such  as  Priority  or  
information related to the AS.  
2.2.5 SIP servers:  Call Session Control Function 
The  CSCF  provides  the  central  control  function  in  the  IMS  Core  Network  to  set  up,  
establish, modify, and tear down multimedia sessions. This is basically a SIP server which 
processes  and  is  responsible  for  all  SIP  signaling  in  the  IMS.  The  CSCF  function  is  
distributed across three types of functional elements based on the specialized function they 
perform [7]. These three elements are the Proxy-CSCF (P-CSCF), Interrogating-CSCF (I-
CSCF), and the Serving-CSCF. 
P-CSCF 
The P-CSCF is an edge access function and is the entry point for a UE to request services 
from  an  IMS  network.  The  P-CSCF  is  allocated  to  the  IMS  terminal  during  IMS  
registration  and  does  not  change  throughout  the  whole  registration  time.  The  role  of  this  
13 
 
SIP server is to function as a proxy by accepting incoming requests and forwarding to the 
entity that can service them. From the SIP point of view, the P-CSCF is acting as an 
inbound/outbound proxy server. The incoming requests are either the initial registration or 
an invitation for a multimedia session. A request of the UE to register for a service is 
normally forwarded to a session controller or to one with the capability to interrogate for it. 
Session invitation requests are forwarded by the P-CSCF to a S-CSCF.  
The P-CSCF also performs some important edge functions. Since this is the first-hop 
access, it establishes and maintains a number of Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) security 
associations with the IMS terminal. It also provides compression of SIP signaling to 
minimize latency over the air interface. SIP messages can be large due to the text based 
nature of SIP protocol. In order to reduce the time to transmit SIP messages, a mechanism 
to compress and decompress the message is used.   It provides a policy function by 
initiating support for IP flow control and authorization of traffic-bearer resources. The P-
CSCF is also capable of handling emergency call sessions. [7] [8] [11] 
The P-CSCF may be located in the home network or in the visited network. The 
location of the P-CSCF is directly related with the location of the Gateway GPRS Support 
Node (GGSN) in the 2.5G networks. Once the IMS reaches the mass market the operators 
will migrate the configuration and the P-CSCF and the GGSN will be definitely located in 
the visited network. 
I-CSCF  
The I-CSCF is a SIP proxy located on the edge of an administrative domain [9]. The 
Domain Name System (DNS) records of the domain store the address of the I-CSCF. The 
SIP server obtains the address of an I-CSCF of the destination domain when it tries to find 
the next SIP hop for a particular message.  
The I-CSCF is responsible for determining which Serving CSCF should be assigned for 
controlling the session requested by the UE. A request to the I-CSCF may come from the 
home network or a visited network through the Proxy CSCF. The I-CSCF obtains the 
request for the address of the S-CSCF from the HSS during a registration request, and 
provides it to the P-CSCF for subsequent multimedia requests.  
The I-CSCF has an interface to the HSS and SLF, which is based on the Diameter 
protocol.  It  can  obtain  the  address  of  S-CSCF from HSS.  And it  could  also  retrieve  user  
location information and route a SIP request received from another network towards the 
appropriate destination, such as the S-CSCF. The I-CSCF may perform transit routing 
functions. When the I-CSCF determines that the destination of the session is not in the 
IMS, it may forward the request or return with a failure response. In some cases the I-CSCF 
can encrypt some parts of SIP messages that contain sensitive information about the 
domain such as the DNS servers, their names or their capacity or information about the 
route  the  SIP  message  has  taken.  This  functionality  is  known  as  Topology  Hiding  Inter-
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network  Gateway (THIG).The  I-CSCF is  usually  located  in  the  home network.  However,  
for  some  special  cases,  for  example,  an  I-CSCF  THIG,  it  may  also  be  located  in  visited  
network. 
S-CSCF 
The S-CSCF is responsible for conducting both registration and session control for the 
registered UE’s sessions. In addition, it is responsible for interfacing with the Application 
Servers in the Application Plane. As a registrar, it enables the network location information 
of the UE to be available through the HSS. It maintains a binding between the user location 
(the IP address of the terminal the user is registered with) and the used SIP address of 
record (also known as Public User Identity). It makes the decision to allow or deny service 
to the UE. Its role is to execute the session request by locating the destination endpoint and 
conducting the signaling toward it. The S-CSCFs maintain a full state of the sessions and 
have the capability to originate and terminate a session on behalf of a requesting endpoint. 
Like I-CSCF, the S-CSCF also implements a Diameter interface to the HSS. The reason is 
to download from the HSS the authentication vectors of the user who wants to access IMS. 
These vectors are used to authenticate the user. The S-CSCF also downloads from the HSS 
the user profile which contains a set of triggers that may route the SIP message through one 
or more AS.  
In  addition  to  acting  as  a  registrar,  the  S-CSCF is  also  responsible  for  routing  all  SIP  
messages to the AS.  To do this, the S-CSCF uses information obtained from the HSS in the 
form of iFC that acts as triggers against inbound session establishment requests.  The iFC 
includes rules that define how and where SIP messages should be routed to the various AS 
that may reside in the Application Plane.  A network may include a number of S-CSCFs in 
the sake of scalability and redundancy. Each of them serves a number of IMS terminals. 
The S-CSCF is always located in the home network. 
2.2.6 Application Servers 
The SIP servers that we already presented don’t provide any added-value services. IMS 
applications are implemented in SIP AS with the help of media servers [11]. Application 
server is a service creation and execution platform that interacts with the S-CSCF using SIP 
via IMS Service Control (ISC) interface. The Figure 2-8 presents the ISC interface between 
the AS and the S-CSCF and the basic principle of the relation between them.  
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Figure 2-8. ISC Interface 
The AS can operate on a SIP User Agent (UA) mode or Back-to-back User Agent 
(B2BUA) mode.  The ASes are responsible for hosting and executing the services. A single 
AS may host multiple services, for example, telephony and messaging services. One 
advantage of this flexibility is to reduce the workload of the control layer. There are many 
application servers providing different services, such as presence service or instant 
messaging service etc.  
The service profile downloaded from the HSS contains a list of ASs, identified by their 
URI,  and  some  filtering  rules.  The  filtering  rules  allow  the  S-CSCF  to  determine  when  
received SIP requests need to be routed to a particular AS. In this way, customized services 
can be applied to the users, and a clear separation is enforced between the basic SIP 
functions (S-CSCF) and the enhanced service logic (AS) [11].  According to [7],  we have 
several kind of AS. We will cite only the most useful for this work, the SIP-AS. This AS, is 
the service part in IMS, supporting well defined signaling and administration interfaces. 
This AS hosts and executes IP multimedia services based on SIP. It is triggered by the S-
CSCF and it comprises filter rules for choosing applications for the handling of the session. 
An AS can be located in the home network or in an external third-party network. If 
located in the home network, it can query the HSS with the Diameter Sh or Si interfaces 
(for a SIP-AS). 
2.3 Overview of SIP  
The Session Initiation Protocol is an application-level signaling protocol defined by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 3261 [12] for creating, modifying, and 
terminating sessions with one or more participant over an IP network. Sessions are 
described using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) defined in RFC 4566 [13]. The 
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SDP  sessions  are  carried  in  the  SIP  messages  and  allow  participant  to  agree  on  a  set  of  
parameters such as transport addresses or media types [11]. In addition, SIP deals with the 
location of the users. For this reason, every user that wants to be able to receive multimedia 
communications has to be registered. This is done through the registration procedure, 
during which the user has to communicate its present location (expressed as a “location” 
SIP URI), together with its public identity (expressed as a “logical” SIP URI), to its home 
SIP server (its registrar server), which will then maintain a table with the mapping. 
SIP follows the well-known client-server model like many other protocols developed 
and  used  by  IETF.  SIP  is  a  text-based  protocol  that  borrows  most  of  its  principles  from  
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) and HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol); two of 
the most successful protocols on the Internet. This means that it is easy to extend, debug 
and use to build services [7]. 
SIP URIs are used to identify users in the SIP architecture. In general they identify 
communication resources. SIP URI follows the general rules for URIs defined in RFC 3986 
[14] as shown in the following example: “sip:name.surname@example.com”. This URI 
is made of user part which identifies a particular resource and host-port part which 
identifies the source providing the resource. This might be a Fully Qualified Domain Name 
(FQDN) or an IP address plus an optional port value. As we will see later, a SIP URI may 
represent [11]: 
x The public identity of a user. This is the identifier that anyone could use to contact 
that user. Example:  sip:gerti.dhima@openims.com 
x A user at a specific host or location. For example in the following SIP URI the user 
bob is located at location 192.168.10.33. Example: 
sip:bob.brown@192.168.10.33 
x A SIP server such as in the example : sip:proxyA.openims.com 
x A group of users such as in the example: mobileUsers@openims.com. This might 
represent all the mobile phone users of a company 
As we can see, some of the SIP URIs point to logical identities and some others indicate 
locations. SIP URIs that point to locations, can be directly resolved to the corresponding IP 
address, port, and transport via DNS queries. Other URIs can be used to identify 
communication resources for example the Telephone Uniform Resource Identifier (TEL 
URI). We will not introduce them in this work but the reader can find more about them in 
[11]. 
SIP Messages 
The communication using SIP means a couple of messages. These messages can be, either 
SIP Requests sent by a client to a server or SIP Responses sent by a server to the client as a 
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response to the SIP Request. The messages are transported by the underlying network 
protocols.  
x Requests are used in order to start a communication or to inform the receiver about 
a request  
x Responses are used in order to confirm that a request has been received and treated 
by the server or to indicate the status of the treatment.  
 
The general format of a SIP messages is: 
request-line 
message-header 
message-body] 
Request-line = Methods Request-URI SIP-Version 
The methods can be: “REGISTER”, “INVITE”, “ACK”, “CANCEL”, “BYE”, 
“OPTION”. The Figure 2-9 presents a simple INVITE request sent by the SIP user 
bob@open-ims.test to start a conversation with the SIP user alice@open-ims.test: 
 
Figure 2-9. Invite message 
Through this example we have shown the most important SIP headers of the simple 
INVITE message. We will see in the implementation chapter of the project that some other 
SIP headers have been added. These new headers contain the Identity of different SIP 
entities and their respective signature. Later on we will discuss more in detail about these 
aspects. In the Table 1 we present the most important SIP headers and their role.  
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SIP Header Role 
Call-ID The Call-ID header uniquely identifies a particular invitation or 
all registrations of a particular client. 
CSeq The CSeq header (command sequence) uniquely identifies 
transactions within a dialog. 
Contact The Contact header contains a list of URLs used to redirect 
future requests. 
Content-Length The Content-Length header indicates the size of the message-
body in decimal number of octets 
Date The Date header field reflects the time when the request or 
response was first sent. 
From The From header indicates the initiator of the request. 
Max-Forwards The Max-Forwards header is used to limit the number of proxies 
or gateways that can forward the request. 
Route The Route header is used to store the route set of a transaction. 
Record-Route The Record-Route headers are used to establish a route for 
transactions belonging to a session. 
To  The To header specifies the "logical" recipient of the request. 
Via The Via header indicates the path taken by the request so far. 
Event The Event header is used to indicate the event or class of events 
the message contains or subscribes. 
Supported The Supported header enumerates all the capabilities of the client 
or server. 
Path The Path header field is a SIP extension header field with syntax 
very similar to the Record-Route header field. 
Content-Type The Content-Type header indicates the media type of the 
message-body sent to the recipient. 
Table 1. The most important Sip headers 
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Figure 2-10. INVITE call flow 
As the mechanism of enhancing the identity assurance is implemented on the basic 
INVITE exchange, we will introduce here the call flow of this exchange as described by the 
standards, presented in the Figure 2-10. For more details one can be referred to [7]. 
In this figure, in red is presented the first INVITE request sent by UserA when he wants 
to start a multimedia conversation with another IMS user (UserB) that can be registered in 
another  IMS  domain  as  presented  in  this  case.  Before  arriving  at  UserB the request pass 
through different SIP servers of the domain A and then B as per a normal INVITE call flow. 
Once this request arrives at the UserB, some other responses are exchanged up to the 
moment UserB decides  to  take  the  call.  In  this  moment,  a  SIP  response  “200 OK” is 
generated by UserB, represented in blue in this figure, and is sent to UserA. In this work we 
modify only the first “INVITE” request and then the last “200OK” response.    
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2.4 SIP Servlet Technology 
A SIP Servlet is a server-side component of Java programming language that performs SIP 
signaling. SIP Servlet was designed to simplify SIP development and attract developers to 
the SIP protocol. They are managed by SIP Servlet containers, which typically are part of a 
SIP-enabled application server [15]. SIP Servlets interact with clients by responding to 
incoming SIP requests and returning corresponding SIP responses. This is comparable to 
the “request/response” model known from HTTP Servlets. They are built using the generic 
servlet Application Programming Interface (API) provided by the Java Servlet 
Specification. 
The Figure 2-11 shows a general overview of the SIP Servlet API and compares it with 
the Servlet API. SIP Servlet are based on Java APIs for Integrated Networks (JAIN SIP), a 
low level Java API specification for SIP Signaling. [16] 
 
Figure 2-11. Servlet API and SIP Servlet API 
SIP Servlet is a Java programming language class that extends the 
“javax.servlet.sip.SipServlet” class, optionally overriding SipServlet's methods 
[15]. These methods are named along the model of “doRequest” where “Request” is a 
SIP request name. For example, the “doINVITE” method will respond to incoming SIP 
“INVITE” requests. 
The SIP Servlet API (JSR 116) is a server-side interface describing a container of SIP 
components or services. For more details the reader can find this API in [17]. The lifecycle 
of SIP Servlets are managed by the SIP Servlet container, which at the same time enables 
network communication for SIP requests and responses by listening on a particular 
listening point. A typical SIP application consists of the following components: 
x one or more SIP Servlets 
x optional utility and helper classes such as SIP listeners 
x static resources used by the classes 
x metadata and configuration files 
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One of the configuration files is “sip.xml” deployment descriptor, which is used by 
the SIP Servlet container to process deployed SIP applications and configure the runtime to 
properly respond to incoming SIP requests [15]. SIP applications are packaged in either SIP 
archive (SAR) or web archive (WAR) files. SIP containers will recognize either the “.sar” 
or “.war” extensions when processing SIP applications. The SAR format includes the use 
of the presence of the “WEB-INF” folder that contains class files and deployment 
descriptors. SIP application that has been packaged in a SAR or WAR may be packaged 
itself within Enterprise archive (EAR). 
We have used SIP Servlet API to develop the application, which will be responsible for 
checking the identity of one SIP entity when an “INVITE” message arrives to the S-
CSCF and then adding the identity and the signature of the SIP server to the message. We 
delegated this task to the application server because in this way the S-CSCF is not 
overloaded with this extra task. This will be better explained when we will discuss the 
implementation of the project in the section 4.3.  
2.5 Principles of cryptography 
In the computer era, cryptography has become a necessity for the exchange of critical 
messages. Indeed, Internet has become an essential communication tool both for business 
and private needs. It appears that the transactions can be intercepted by malicious people 
for several purposes: just to get some information (passive listening), to stop exchanges, or 
even to modify it. So, there is an obvious need for a security system or mechanism.  
The cryptography is a technique which aims at protecting the confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity of the information by ciphering the messages. By applying arithmetic 
calculations to the original message (plain text), it creates a new message unreadable 
without applying a specific action (cipher text). Most of the time, we use a cipher key to 
cipher a message, and a decipher key to decipher a message. There are two kinds of 
encryption:  the  symmetric  and  the  asymmetric  ones.  The  next  sections  will  present  them  
and also the principle of digital signatures which derives from them. 
2.5.1 Symmetric encryption 
The symmetric encryption uses symmetric keys or “secret keys”. A representation of the 
symmetric mechanism is given in the Figure 2-12. The sender and the receiver share a 
common secret key. The sender ciphers the message with this secret key, and the receiver 
deciphers it with the same secret key. As a consequence, the confidentiality of the message 
is ensured.  
This is a very efficient method as, if anyone intercepted the message, he couldn't get the 
information because he wouldn't have the secret key. The problem with this method is that, 
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it  is  assumed  that  the  two  users  share  a  common  secret.  In  the  Internet  world,  as  people  
communicating with each other can be at the two sides of the world, the key exchange may 
need to be done through the network. Thus, we come back to the initial situation where we 
need  to  secure  this  exchange.  Rather  than  doing  so,  a  second  encryption  method,  the  
asymmetric cipher, exists to avoid these problems: the asymmetric cipher. 
Figure 2-12. Symmetrical encryption and decryption [18] 
2.5.2 Asymmetric encryption 
Asymmetric encryption uses asymmetric keys which are a pair of private/public keys. This 
method can solve the problem of key distribution caused by the symmetric encryption. 
Indeed,  rather  than  having  a  single  secret  key,  each  user  is  going  to  have  a  pair  of  
cryptographic keys: a private key and a public key. The private key is kept secret while the 
public key can be widely spread. Contrary to the symmetric encryption, as we can see in the 
Figure 2-13, the encryption and decryption are done with different keys. Every time the 
Originator wants to send a message to the End User and wants to make sure he is going to 
be the only one who can read it, he has to get the End User's public key, encrypt the 
message with it and send it to him. When the End User receives the message, he decrypts it 
with his private key. Thus, the Originator can be sure that nobody else than the End User 
can open his message, because he is the only one who has the appropriate private key. 
Consequently, the confidentiality of the message is assured. 
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Figure 2-13. Asymmetrical encryption and description [18] 
The main advantage of this technique is to avoid the decryption key distribution 
problem, because the public keys can be freely sent. But there is a new challenge rising. 
The receiver has to be sure that the public key that he get from the sender is really this one 
corresponding to the person that he thinks. Still, it is easier to implement and more secured 
than the symmetric encryption. In reality the most systems use asymmetric keys to encrypt 
the symmetric key, which is used to encrypt the actual message. 
2.5.3 Digital signature 
The asymmetric encryption enables the creation of the digital signatures which aim at 
protecting the message. It consists of applying a hash function to a message and then 
encrypting it with the private key to obtain a signature. The generation of this signature is 
represented in the Figure 2-14. This one is a kind of DNA of the message, which is added 
to the original message to produce a signed message. Once this signed message received, 
the signature can be verified by the receiver as shown in the Figure 2-14:  
x The end user gets the signature 
x He deciphers it with the sender's public key 
x And then, it compares the result with the result of the hash function on the message 
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Figure 2-14. Generation and validation of the signature [19] 
A signature generated with a certain private key is validated by using the corresponding 
public key. Moreover, it should not be computationally feasible to generate a valid 
signature  for  a  party  who  does  not  have  the  private  key.  This  process  guarantees  the  
integrity of the message by creating a hash of it and its authenticity by encrypting this hash 
with the private key. [20] 
2.6 The main security problems of IMS 
In  the  above  sections  we gave  a  general  overview of  the  IMS architecture.  Now we will  
discuss some security problems related to IMS and more precisely to the signaling protocol 
it is using.  
The IMS architecture presents significant security challenges that must be addressed by 
the carriers as IMS moves into widespread deployment. The generally open and distributed 
architecture creates the advantage of flexibility in implementation and deployment. It also 
creates a multitude of interface points that must be secured [21]. The security in IMS is an 
important and urgent issue and it is required to ensure that every SIP based Internet service 
can meet the corresponding security requirements. 
25 
 
 
Figure 2-15. IMS Security Architecture [21] 
According to [21], in the Figure 2-15, five different security associations within the IMS 
are identified: 
1. Mutual authentication between the UE and the IMS. The HSS delegates this to the 
S-CSCF but the HSS is responsible for generating the keys and challenges. 
2. Secure link and security association between the UE and P-CSCF for authentication 
of data origin. 
3. The Cx interface provides internal security for the link between the CSCF and HSS. 
This association plays an important role in securing the keys and challenges during 
the UE registration process. 
4. Link which provides security between the P-CSCF and other core SIP services 
when the UE is roaming in a Visited Network (VN). 
5. This link provides security between the P-CSCF and other core SIP services when 
the UE is operating in the Home Network (HN). 
The main problems are also related to the underlying protocols that IMS and SIP are 
using.  SIP protocol, according to RFC 3261 [12], utilizes transport protocols such as TCP 
and UDP. As a result, SIP inherits the vulnerabilities of these protocols. As noted in RFC 
2617 [22], SIP authentication typically uses HTTP digest authentication, which is 
vulnerable to many forms of known attacks. According to [23], the HTTP digest 
authentication in SIP suffers from a major weakness when it is applied in SIP. It is the lack 
of securing all headers and parameters in SIP which would possibly need protection.  
Since the current authentication mechanism is not providing security at an acceptable 
level, several new schemes are proposed to improve it. One can find a non-exhaustive list 
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of these schemes in [24]. Some of the mechanisms suggested to increase the SIP security 
are  S/MIME,  IPSec  and  TLS.  Moreover  with  the  last  developments  in  the  networks  and  
computing technologies, it becomes easier for the new players and third part service 
providers to enter the market. Therefore signaling and data packets can traverse 
untrustworthy network realms. According to the specifications [25], the security of IMS is 
based on the fact that the multimedia sessions are supposed to be taken place between 
trusted entities. Thus, the operator static relationship cannot rely anymore in old paradigms 
to guarantee the user identity end-to-end. Because of these new developments, there is a 
real need for new methods that provide better assurance about the identity of the entities 
taking part in a multimedia conversation. In order to provide the recipient of a SIP message 
with greater assurance of the identity of the sender, a cryptographic signature can be 
provided over the headers of the SIP request, which allows the signer to assert a verifiable 
identity as described in RFC 3893 [26]. 
In this particular technologic background and actual state of art, we have implemented a 
new mechanism which takes advantage of IMS architecture to establish a trust between the 
entities taking part in a multimedia session in a roaming scenario. We will better introduce 
the work in the next section. 
2.7 Proposition of an secured identity exchange mechanism  
In order to make the authentication mechanism security level meet the requirements, one 
solution can consist in exchanging secured identities before starting a multimedia session. 
Based on the paper [9], this thesis proposes to take advantage of the IMS’s ability to easily 
and rapidly provide services developed in application servers to imagine a service which 
could implement this security mechanism. The home operators of the users guarantee the 
identities of their users and are assumed to trust each other thanks to a roaming agreement. 
This kind of agreement can link two telephone companies to outline the terms and 
conditions under which the participating companies will provide wireless service to their 
subscribers (it dictates the liabilities of the parties and the necessary security association). 
Roaming agreements are useful when companies can’t offer a complete national or 
international coverage. It’s assumed that every entity has a secure cryptographic identifier 
attributed. The possession of this secured identifier enables its owner to prove his identity. 
In this project, the necessary initial signaling needed to enhance the trust between the 
parties in the communication is carried by the IMS architecture. 
The mechanism envisaged is based on local trust decisions and roaming agreements. It 
does  not  rely  on  the  existence  of  a  global  PKI  which  avoids  the  problems  relying  to  the  
future dynamic networks. There probably will not be any agreement about the common 
global trust roots. Thus in practice, such a security infrastructure would not be very 
practical to establish and to support.  
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The Figure 2-16 shows how the chain of trust between two SIP users UserA and UserB 
is established. The operators trust their respective users and the trust relationship between 
the operators allows UserA and UserB to trust each others. This leads to create a chain of 
trust between the two users. 
 
Figure 2-16. Chain of trust establishment between two SIP users 
In practice, the fact that two entities trust each others can mean that they share secured 
information. Every entity is in possession of his own secured information which represents 
his identity. Every time one wants to prove his identity, he has to show that it is in 
possession of this secured information. In this project, we chose to use Public Keys to 
constitute the entities’ secured identity. The Figure 2-17 represents the creation of the 
cryptographic identifier which is based on a public Key. By applying hashing to the public 
key attributed to the entity, we can form a concise representation of this identity, Hash 
Identity Tag (HIT). Basically, HIT and public Key represent the same thing (the entity’s 
cryptographic  identity),  the  HIT  is  just  more  suited  for  protocols.  Moreover  it  has  to  be  
noted that the term HIT that we use in this specific context should not be mixed with the 
same term used  in  Host  Identity  Protocol  context.  Even  though the  identity  we presented  
here is based on the HIT representation, there are some differences that we have to keep in 
mind. The identity that we are using is not exactly the same as HIT in a typical HIP 
exchange. Actually in HIP it has certain structure as well to give it a IPv6 interpretation. In 
this work we haven’t implemented HIP specific exchange, but just the assured identity 
exchange.  
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Figure 2-17. Creation of the HIT based on the public Key 
In essence, when two entities want to establish a trust between them, they first exchange 
their  identities  HIT  (or  their  Public  keys  with  which  they  calculated  the  HIT,  like  in  the  
Figure 2-18). Then, when they need to communicate in a trusted way, they just have to 
prove that they are in possession of their own identity (or of their Public Key).  
 
Figure 2-18. Distribution of the cryptographic keys 
When one entity wants to prove its identity when sending a message, it sends this 
cryptographic identifier HIT in the message, and protects it by a signature. As shown in the 
Figure 2-19, this signature is calculated by ciphering the hash of some fields selected in the 
message with the private key. By doing this, all these fields become protected, which 
means that the correspondent can be sure of their authenticity. Our interest lies on 
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protecting the following headers: From, To, Date_sent, Call-Id, Cseq. For 
example, securing the header Date_sent protects the message from replay attacks, while 
the header Call-Id would prevent a third part from modifying the type of message (for 
example to transform an INVITE message in a BYE one in order to end the conversation). 
The new headers containing the HIT (P-End-Pub-Identity-Info) and the identity 
of the user (P-End-Pub-Identity) are also protected by the signature to prevent them 
from being falsified. Their description is defined in the section 4.1.1. 
 
Figure 2-19. Creation of the signature with the private key 
In practice, we modify the messages exchanged between the two users by adding this 
secured cryptographic identity, so that every user can prove his identity. We also protect the 
message with a signature. The next paragraphs show the different behaviors of each entity 
towards these specific messages. 
In the first SIP “INVITE” message, shown in the Figure 2-20, UserA sends his identity 
information (HIT) and the algorithm used to obtain it (ALG). The contents and the relevant 
SIP headers are protected with a signature. 
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Figure 2-20. UserA sends the first SIP INVITE message 
In the next phase, presented in the Figure 2-21, the message is received by the proxy P-
CSCF1. Depending on where the user is, P-CSCF1 can belong to the user’s home network, 
or to another operator. First, the proxy verifies the message fields, for example, it checks if 
the user is registered and if all the media parameters fit the current local policy. Then, the 
proxy does not do much else than forward the message to the user’s home network: S-
CSCF_A. However, it can add some new headers like “P-Asserted-Identity” (which 
represents  its  own  definition  of  the  identity  of  the  user)  or  “Record Route” (where it 
indicates its own SIP URI) [7]. However, the reliability of this information depends on the 
existence of security association between the access (P-CSCF1) and home operators (S-
CSCF_A) as it is generally expected that the IMS charging information is exchanged only 
between trusted networks. Then, the message is forwarded to the home network of UserA. 
 
Figure 2-21. Message INVITE forwarded by the Proxy. 
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In the Figure 2-22, when S-CSCF_A receives the message, it can check the 
correspondence of the registered user identities. Of course, it is assumed that the user has 
previously registered the identities he is using on this connection. He has already shared his 
cryptographic identity (HIT) as a secret with his operator. There are several ways to share 
this secret. Either, it can be already recorded in the Universal Subscriber Identifier Module 
(USIM) card of the SIP phone and in the database of the operator, either it can be shared 
during the “REGISTER” phase. This second solution is more secured as the shared secret 
changes  every  time the  user  performs a  call,  but  the  first  one  is  the  easiest  to  implement  
because it avoids all the key exchange problems. After this, and the verification of the 
signature, S-CSCF_A can sign user’s HIT, which means to add some specific headers in the 
message (Cf. in the section 4.1.2). By doing this, the home operator indicates that this user 
can be trusted at this expressed application level identity. Based on the receiver’s Address 
of Record (AoR), the message is forwarded to the home operator of that entity (S-
CSCF_B). 
 
Figure 2-22. The message is forwarded to the home network of UserB  
The next step, presented in the Figure 2-23, is the reception of the message by the home 
network of UserB (S-CSCF_B). This one has a roaming agreement with the home network 
of UserA and has exchanged its identity with it. As a consequence, S-CSCF_B can check 
that the message from the server can be trusted. Then, because the message has been signed 
by the S-CSCF_A, the identity of the sender is assured. Thus, it is willing to forward traffic 
from this operator to its own subscribers. S-CSCF_B proceeds in including its own 
assurance to the identity of UserA as a token of trust it has on the established agreement.  
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Figure 2-23. The home network of UserB forwards the message to UserB’s proxy 
In the last phase as illustrated in the Figure 2-24, UserB receives the message 
containing the specific headers of trust from its own home operator. It is assumed that the 
user is in possession of the identity of his home operator, so he can check that he can trust 
this message by comparing the identity presented in the specific headers added by his home 
operator and the saved identity. Then, UserB can save UserA’s identity for a later use, and 
sends the response to the request INVITE with his own configuration information and 
relevant identities protected by a signature. These new headers added in the message have a 
double goal: first, they assure UserB’s identity to his home operator, and then, they let 
know this identity to UserA, when the message will be forwarded to him.   
 
Then, the procedure described in the Figure 2-25 works to the opposite direction in a 
similar fashion. Indeed, UserB’s home operator assures UserB’s identity, and based on 
Figure 2-24. Reception of the message by UserB 
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transitivity, UserA’s home operator asserts the received identities. The response is 
forwarded to UserA. 
 
Figure 2-25. UserB's answer to UserA's INVITE forwarded to UserA 
The Figure 2-26 presents UserA’s behavior when receiving this answer. UserA 
concludes the transaction by sending an acknowledgment (ACK) message directly to UserB 
as in typical SIP transaction. In this ACK message, UserA includes the HIT representing 
his secured identity that UserB had previously saved when receiving the first message 
Invite (shown in the Figure 2-26). When UserB receives this ACK message, he can check 
the correspondence of the identities received and saved. When the test confirms UserA’s 
identity, he answers with a similar ACK message containing his own HIT that UserA can 
verify. After this, the identity association is realized; UserA and UserB can switch to 
communicate directly on IP layer with the negotiated session parameters as they are in 
possession of each other’s assured identities.  
 
Figure 2-26. Identity Association 
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Figure 2-27.  INVITE Message flow                                     
Finally, the whole mechanism presented in the Figure 2-27 enables to create an identity 
association between UserA and UserB. These users are roaming in networks different from 
their home networks, and can trust each others thanks to the secured identity exchange. 
This mechanism relies on local trusts and dynamic roaming agreements. It differs from a 
typical IMS setup by the fact that the relationships between operators are dynamically 
established, which contrasts with the actual IMS environments, where the relationships are 
static and trust is based on the reliability of the operator. Even if this scenario isn’t yet a 
reality, it’s expected to be more likely in the future ubiquitous environment. [9] 
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3 Software environments and tools used 
In this chapter we will introduce different software environments that we have used as 
background technologies and platforms in order to develop, implement and test this project. 
The Open Source IMS architecture from FOKUS Institute will be introduced as well as the 
IMS  clients  and  the  application  server  that  have  been  used  to  perform  the  tests.  We  will  
also introduce the background tools that we have used such as Wireshark, Eclipse 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and server access in distance via Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) and Secure Shell (Ssh).  
3.1 IMS environment 
The Open Source IMS core project has been used as an IMS platform for this work. This 
project offers all the basic components of an IMS core network that were needed during the 
thesis work. Even though nowadays there are already many Open Source projects 
established in the plain VoIP area for SIP clients, proxies, stacks and tools around the IETF 
SIP standards, but there are practically no Open Source projects with specific focus on the 
IMS. The OSIMS project aims to fill the currently existing IMS void in the Open Source 
software landscape with a flexible and extendable solution that has already proven its 
conformance and performance in several national and international Research and 
Development (R&D) projects. [5] 
3.1.1 Open Source IMS Core Network from Fokus  
The OSIMS is an Open Source implementation of IMS CSCFs, the central routing elements 
for any IMS signaling, and a lightweight  HSS, which together form the core elements of 
all IMS/NGN architectures as specified today within 3GPP, 3GPP2 (3rd Generation 
Partnership  Project  2),  ETSI  TISPAN  [27].  It  is  based  on  the  open  source  project  SIP  
Express Router (SER) and has been developed by the Fraunhofer Institute FOKUS in 
Germany. The first versions appeared during 2006 and are designed for Linux-based 
platforms. 
The sole purpose of this platform is to provide an IMS core implementation reference 
for IMS technology testing and IMS application prototyping for research purposes, 
typically performed in IMS test-beds. 
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Figure 3-1. Fokus IMS architecture [5] 
The main functions and interfaces of the OSIMS are presented in the Figure 3-1. We 
will describe them more in detail in the next section.  
3.1.2 Implementation of IMS principles in Open Source IMS Core 
This implementation offers all the basic functions of an IMS core network that is, P-CSCF, 
I-CSCF and S-CSCF. It offers also the HSS function, which is responsible for provisioning 
users and the associated service profiles in order to deploy different services.  
P-CSCF 
In the current implementation of the OSIMS, the P-CSCF component is able to firewall the 
core network at the application level: only registered endpoints are allowed to insert 
messages inside the IMS network and the P-CSCF asserts the identity of the users. After a 
successful registration process to an IMS home network, subsequent user messages are 
forwarded based on DNS information towards the requested IMS home network. In the 
Figure 3-2, it is shown the modular architecture of the P-CSCF implemented by the OSIMS. 
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Figure 3-2. Proxy CSCF [28] 
I-CSCF 
The  role  of  the  I-CSCF  is  a  stateless  proxy  that  queries  the  HSS,  by  using  the  indicated  
public identities of the caller or the callee, and based on responses routes the message to the 
correct S-CSCF. It implements the Cx interface [29] of an I-CSCF to the HSS. Therefore it 
supports the required Diameter commands to locate the user-assigned S-CSCF or to select, 
based on capabilities, a new S-CSCF and check identities for roaming authorizations. 
 
Figure 3-3. Interrogating CSCF [28] 
After receiving a successful answer for the Diameter query, the I-CSCF forwards the 
SIP messages in a transactional mode. To protect the home network, it has a firewalling 
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capacity that only allows signaling messages coming from trusted networks. In the Figure 
3-3 it is shown the modular architecture of the I-CSCF implemented by the OSIMS. 
S-CSCF  
The S-CSCF implementation also communicates with the HSS using Diameter (over the Cx 
interface) to retrieve authentication vectors, update registration information and download 
the user profiles as specified in [29].The S-CSCF can apply specific iFC to enforce specific 
SIP  routing  rules.  In  the  Figure  3-4,  it  is  shown  the  modular  architecture  of  the  S-CSCF  
implemented by the OSIMS. 
 
Figure 3-4. Serving CSCF [28] 
Some of the features of the OSIMS S-CSCF related to this project are [28]: 
x Authentication through AKAv1-MD5(Authentication and Key Agreement version 
1- Message Digest 5), AKAv2-MD5 and MD5 
x Download of Service-Profile from HSS 
x Initial Filter Criteria triggering 
x ISC interface routing towards Application Servers 
HSS 
The OSIMS would be incomplete without a Home Subscriber Server. FOKUS developed its 
own prototype, the FOKUS Home Subscriber Server (FHoSS), which is entirely written in 
Java and based upon Open Source software. The user data is kept inside a MySQL database. 
It is mostly a configurator for the Database Management System and the Diameter 
interfaces with the CSCFs and IMS application layer. 
39 
 
 
Figure 3-5. FOKUS Home Subscriber Server [28] 
The  FHoSS  allows  the  generation  of  authentication  vectors  and  it  provides  a  HTTP-
based management interface for easy management of user profiles and associated iFCs. In 
the  
Figure 3-5 it is shown the modular architecture of the FHoSS implemented by the 
OSIMS. To manage and maintain the FHoSS, a web based management interface is 
provided. This provides a clear structure and separation of logic and Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) related tasks. The rendering is done by several Java Server Pages which 
can be found in the src-web folder. 
3.1.3 Prerequisites, installation and configuration of OSIMS 
The installation and configuration steps can be found in the website of the Open IMS 
project available in [30]. In order to install the key components of OSIMS platform some 
hardware, software and network prerequisites are required.  
As hardware requirements, a current Linux desktop class machine should be enough but 
if we want to get ultimate performance, then it is better to have several Gigabytes of 
Random Access Memory (RAM) and as many Central  Processing Units (CPUs)/Cores as 
needed.  
As software requirements, we need to install several modules such as subversion in 
order to download the fresh code. Different packages such as GCC3/4, make, Java 
Development Kit version 1.5 (JDK1.5), ant used for Java development are needed to be 
installed first. In this work we used MySQL as  a  Database  Management  System (DBMS) 
which is supported by FHoSS, I-SCSF and other functions requiring a DBMS. 
Development libraries libxml and libmysql are required. Linux kernel 2.6 and ipsec-tools are 
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needed to use IPSec security. In addition, we use bind9 as a name server. And we choose 
Google Chrome which can connect to the box as a browser.  
As network access requirements, a controllable DNS server should be enough. At the 
beginning we configured virtual IP interfaces over the loopback. In this way we had a better 
view while analyzing with Wireshark. This was when we configured everything in one 
Linux box. Then we configured two IMS domains and in this case we changed the 
configuration done previously and configured the two IMS domains over the eth0 of that 
machine. We will better explain later the configuration needed in the two cases. The full list 
of the prerequisites can be found in the IMS Installation Guide [30]. 
Get the source code 
Once the prerequisites installed, we continue with the installation and the configuration of 
the  FHoSS  and  then  the  CSCFs  which  are  the  core  components  of  OSIMS.  We  start  by  
downloading the fresh code of FHoSS and CSCFs at 
“http://svn.berlios.de/svnroot/repos/openimscore” and get the FHoSS source 
code at “FHoSS/trunk” and CSCFs source code at “ser_ims/trunk”. The source code is 
pre-configured to work from a standard file path. For that, we create the directory 
“/opt/OpenIMSCore” and then go there to create two new directories “FHoSS” to checkout 
the HSS and “ser_ims” to checkout the CSCFs. 
 
#>mkdir /opt/OpenIMSCore 
#>cd /opt/OpenIMSCore  
#>mkdir FhoSS 
#>svn checkout 
http://svn.berlios.de/svnroot/repos/openimscore/FHoSS/trunk FHoSS 
#>mkdir ser_ims 
#>svn checkout 
http://svn.berlios.de/svnroot/repos/openimscore/ser_ims/trunk ser_ims 
Compile 
Before compilation, we must be sure we have a version of JDK superior or equals to 1.5. 
And then, we use ant to build and install the FHoSS. Starting from the installation directory 
of OSIMS we enter in FHoSS directory and then compile the sources of FHoSS and then 
install it. 
#>cd FHoSS 
#>ant compile 
#>ant deploy 
In similar way, we compile and install the code of CSCFs in the “ser_ims” directory. 
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#>cd ser_ims 
#>make install-libs all 
#>cd .. 
Configure the environment if one IMS domain 
At the beginning, in order to test the project, we decided to configure all the SIP servers, 
IMS clients and AS in a single machine and the default domain we configured was “open-
ims.test”.  Configuration of IP virtual addresses over loopback  
According to the Installation Guide, the IP addresses of the SIP servers, the FHoSS and the 
IMS clients, by default, were configured over the loopback address “127.0.0.1” with 
different ports. In order to have a better view of the architecture, we have configured 
different virtual network interfaces over the loopback. So basically we differentiated the 
traffic over these virtual interfaces. Then we binded over these virtual interfaces the SIP 
servers, the FHoSS, the Application Server and the IMS clients according to the 
architecture presented in the Figure 3-6.  
 
Figure 3-6. Address planning 
First of all, in order to configure nine virtual interfaces we start by editing the file 
“/etc/network/interfaces”. The reader can find the configuration file in Appendix A. 
Here, we proceed by describing the configuration of the DNS server. The domain name that 
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we have chosen is “open-ims.test” according to the Installation Guide. First of all we 
have to copy to the bind configuration directory “/etc/bind/” the DNS zone file 
accessible in the “/ser_ims/cfg/” directory. 
#>sudo cp ~/ser_ims/cfg/open-ims.dnszone /etc/bind/open-ims.dnszone 
Then we edit the file “named.conf” and insert the DNS zone file there. 
#>cd /etc/bind/ 
#>sudo vim named.conf 
zone "open-ims.test" IN { 
  type master; 
  file "/etc/bind/open-ims.dnszone"; 
  notify no; }; 
Then, the file “/etc/bind/open-ims.dnszone” has to be modified in order to assign 
the IP addresses to the SIP servers, IMS clients and Application Server. The reader can find 
in the Appendix B how this file should look like for the architecture we present. 
Now the DNS server should be restarted and the modification will be taken into account.  
#>sudo /etc/init.d/bind9 restart 
In the same time we have to edit the file “/etc/resolv.conf” in order to point to the new 
installed DNS server. 
search open-ims.test 
nameserver 10.1.22.101 
We can test if the different servers are resolvable with the command “dig”.  
#>dig pcscf.open-ims.test Configuring the MySQL 
In order to use FHoSS, we needed a database. For this we used the sql scripts that can be 
found following the installation root directory. These scripts are used to create a MySQL 
database and then to add two users. Also we installed the icscf.sql into the MySQL 
database.  
#>mysql -u root -p -h localhost < FHoSS/scripts/hss_db.sql   
#>mysql -u root -p -h localhost < FHoSS/scripts/userdata.sql 
#>mysql -u root -p -h localhost < ser_ims/cfg/icscf.sql 
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 Configure the IMS core 
At this stage we should have the DNS and MySQL working. As the last step, we have to 
copy several files from the directory “/ser_ims/cfg” to “/opt/OpenIMSCore”, the 
current directory.  
#>cd /opt/OpenIMSCore 
#>cp ser_ims/cfg/*.cfg .  
#>cp ser_ims/cfg/*.xml .  
#>cp ser_ims/cfg/*.sh .  
All  these  files  can  be  modified  to  our  own  preference  in  order  to  match  the  
configuration we want to have. If one wants to use the default configuration then there is no 
need to change the parameters. In the directory “/FHoSS/deploy/” some of the files that  
can be modified are: 
x “DiameterPeerHSS.xml”: we need to modify the peer configuration here like 
the FQDN, Realm, Acceptor Port and Authorized identifiers. 
x “hibernate.properties”: what  we  can  configure  are  the  main  properties  for  
hibernate; implicitly is configured to connect to the mysql on the localhost 
(127.0.0.1:3306). The most relevant properties are: 
“hibernate.connection.url=jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/hssdb” 
“hibernate.connection.username=hss” 
“hibernate.connection.password=hss” 
x “hss.properties”: Specify configuration like on which address the tomcat is 
listening (e.g. “host=localhost”) and the relative path of the web interface of the 
FHoSS. (e.g. “appPath=/hss.web.console”). Other parameters like 
“operatorId”, “amfId” and “defaultPsiImpi” can be specified here. 
x “log4j.properties”: Contains configuration for the logger. The most relevant 
things here are the output file path of the logger and the level of logging. 
Changes to the Configuration if two IMS domains 
We described in the previous section the configuration related to one domain. As the aim of 
this project is to implement an assured identity exchange in a roaming scenario, we 
configured another IMS domain and then integrate it with the first one. We will continue by 
describing this configuration and explain all the difficulties.  
The final version of the project was developed on two distant machines. In this way, the 
project could be available to everyone who wants to test it or to be base on it for future 
research. These two machines were in the same local network and their addresses were: 
ims-a.rd.tut.fi (130.230.141.36) 
ims-b.rd.tut.fi (130.230.141.37) 
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On the first machine (ims-a) we have installed and configured the first domain named 
“open-ims.test” and on the second machine (ims-b) we have installed the second 
domain named “open-ims2.test”.  In this case we will configure all the SIP servers of a 
domain on the IP address of that machine. This solution is not the best one for analyzing 
the traffic with Wireshark. This is the reason why we first configured on one box by 
creating virtual addresses binded over the loopback.  
All the SIP server’s configuration files should be modified in order to change the IP 
address configured by default on “127.0.0.1”.  It  might  be  very  useful  to  use  the  script  
configurator.sh. It can be found in “opt/OpenIMSCore/ser_ims/cfg/”. This script is 
based on the function seed and takes as arguments the configuration files that we want to 
modify. The most important files to be modified are:  
#>sh configurator.sh /opt/OpenIMSCore/ser_ims/cfg/*.xml 
#>sh configurator.sh /opt/OpenIMSCore/ser_ims/cfg/*.sql 
#>sh configurator.sh /opt/OpenIMSCore/ser_ims/cfg/*.cfg 
#>sh configurator.sh /opt/OpenIMSCore/FHoSS/deploy/hss.properties    
#>sh configurator.sh /opt/OpenIMSCore/FHoSS/deploy/DiameterPeerHSS.xml 
#>sh configurator.sh /opt/OpenIMSCore/FHoSS/scripts/hss_db.sql       
Once the script executed we enter the new domain name and the new IP addresses of 
the SIP servers. The script will modify the old domain name and IP addresses with the new 
ones.  The basic configuration of the second domain is the same as the configuration we 
already  described  about  the  first  domain.  But  still  there  are  some  changes  related  to  the  
integration of the two domains. More specifically, particular attention should be paid to the 
configuration of the DNS. We configured the DNS on the “ims-b.rd.tut.fi”. Here, we 
will present the changes done to integer the second domain with the first one.  
On the file “/etc/bind/named.conf” of the “ims-b.rd.tut.fi” we enter two zones 
that correspond to the first and the second domain. Then in the zone file 
“/etc/bind/open-ims.test” and “/etc/bind/open-ims2.test” we configure the IP 
addresses related to every SIP server and the AS used respectively on the first and the 
second domain.   
#>vim /etc/bind/named.conf 
zone "open-ims.test" IN{ 
        type master; 
        file "/etc/bind/open-ims.dnszone"; 
        notify no; 
}; 
zone "open-ims2.test" IN{ 
        type master; 
        file "/etc/bind/open-ims2.dnszone"; 
        notify no; 
}; 
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On the “ims-a.rd.tut.fi” we modified the file “/etc/resolv.conf” in order to 
indicate the new DNS configured on the second machine. On the “ims-b.rd.tut.fi” we 
modified the same file by indicating the DNS configured on that machine. 
ims-a#> vim /etc/resolv.conf 
search open-ims.test 
nameserver 130.230.141.37 
ims-b#> vim /etc/resolv.conf 
search open-ims2.test 
nameserver 130.230.141.37 
With these basic configurations we were able to integrate two IMS domains. We can 
test this configuration with the command dig from the “ims-a.rd.tut.fi” as shown in the 
example. This command proves that the DNS configuration is correct.  
ims-a#> dig scscf.open-ims2.test 
 
; <<>> DiG 9.7.0-P1 <<>> scscf.open-ims2.test 
;; global options: +cmd 
;; Got answer: 
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 47396 
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 
1 
 
;; QUESTION SECTION: 
;scscf.open-ims2.test.          IN      A 
 
;; ANSWER SECTION: 
scscf.open-ims2.test.   86400   IN      A       130.230.141.37 
 
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: 
open-ims2.test.         86400   IN      NS      ns.open-ims2.test. 
 
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: 
ns.open-ims2.test.      86400   IN      A       130.230.141.37 
 
;; Query time: 0 msec 
;; SERVER: 130.230.141.37#53(130.230.141.37) 
;; WHEN: Mon Aug 30 13:09:37 2010 
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 87 
Some other issues should be taken into account when testing our project with two 
domains. There are some modifications done to the AS in order to specify the new IP 
address, here “130.230.141.37”. Attention is required when configuring the iFC on the 
second domain. In general, the main procedure does not change.   
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Start the components 
The next step after installation is to start each module of CSCFs: “pcscf.sh”, 
“icscf.sh”, “scscf.sh” and  at  the  same  time.  In  order  to  start  the  FHoSS  the  
“startup.sh” is used.   
#>cd /opt/OpenIMSCore 
#>sh ./pcscf.sh 
#>sh ./icscf.sh 
#>sh ./scscf.sh 
#>sh ./startup.sh 
We should make sure that each component can connect to HSS. And in this process, we 
could see periodical log messages with the content of the registrar and with the opened 
diameter links. After that, we can check the web interface on “http://localhost:8080/”. 
In order to connect as admin one should use as username: “hssAdmin” and as password: 
“hss”.  
Configure Subscribers 
By default, FHoSS comes provisioned with a couple of sample users: 
alice@open-ims.test 
bob@open-ims.test  
 
We can create new users using the web management interface on 
“http://localhost:8080/hss.web.console/”. In order to manage the FHoSS you 
should use “hssAdmin” as user login and “hss” as password. In order to create new users 
there are few easy steps to follow: 
x create a Subscription 
x create a Private Identity 
x create a Public Identity 
x link them 
For more information follow the Installation Guide [30]. 
3.2 IMS Clients 
The IMS Client  chosen  for  this  project  has  to  meet  some requirements:  first,  it  has  to  be  
compatible with the IMS environment and then, it has to be open source, so that we can get 
and modify its code. The installation guide of OSIMS recommends several IMS clients such 
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as UCT, Monster and IMS Communicator. The next sections present them, and explain 
which one we chose for this project. 
3.2.1 Clients UCT and Monster 
Concerning the IMS UCT [31] client, there was a problem of compatibility between the 
software and the machine on which we developed (i386), so we couldn’t use this IMS 
Client. Monster [32]  was  interesting  in  the  sense  that  it  was  developed  by  the  same  
community that created OSIMS and it was totally compatible with the IMS environment. 
Moreover, it was a simple IMS client with all the basic functions and no complicated 
features that could lead to mistakes when first launched.  
As a consequence, the IMS client Monster is ideal for the testing phase of the IMS 
environment. Even if it was not Open Source, this simple IMS client enabled us to see if the 
IMS environment was well configured (if the clients could register themselves and then 
initiate a call with another IMS client). The Figure 3-7 shows the configuration of the 
Monster client needed with the OSIMS environment. 
 
 
With Wireshark,  we  could  follow the  call  flow and  see  to  which  entities  the  message  
was forwarded. After verifying that the IMS environment was well configured, we 
downloaded the sources of the third IMS Client possible: IMS Communicator [33]. The 
next section presents this last client. 
Figure 3-7. Configuration of the client Monster 
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3.2.2 IMS Communicator 
IMS Communicator was created to fill the need to have an IMS client able to use and test 
all  the  new  services  and  convergence  scenarios  made  possible  with  SIP  and  the  IMS  
architecture. It was originally developed by PT Inovaçao in order to support the 
development and testing of IMS/NGN components for its Service Handling on IP Networks 
(SHIPNET)  IMS/NGN architecture.  Now,  it  is  open  to  the  community  as  an  open  source  
project. It is licensed with the Apache Software License and the GNU Lesser General 
Public License (LGPL). 
Based on a SIP project (SIP-Communicator softphone), IMS Communicator is built on 
top  of  the  JAIN  SIP  RI,  to  which  contributions  were  also  made  to  support  the  IMS  SIP  
extensions defined by 3GPP and IETF. Java Media Framework (JMF) API provides its 
media stack. This IMS client is multiplatform compliant and is written in Java. 
To  fit  to  the  IMS  requirements,  several  development  efforts  had  to  be  made  on  the  
original SIP Communicator client.  Indeed,  it  was  needed  to  implement  the  IMS  
Registration and Authentication and the IMS Session establishment: 
x IMS Registration and Authentication  
o support of IMPI  
o authentication algorithm AKAv1  
o subscription to the “reg” event package  
x Security Agreement mechanism (no IPSec though)  
o IMS Session Establishment  
o Precondition Mechanism  
o Early Media  
o Call transfer 
In practice, we can see that new functions and specific to IMS appear in the java 
sources (for example, methods to create the different IMS messages like REGISTER or 
INVITE). [33] 
3.2.3 Installation and configuration of IMS Communicator 
Installation 
To install IMS Communicator, some requirements have to be filled:  
x JRE 1.5 (Java Runtime Environment) installed 
x J2DK 1.5 (Java 2 Development Kit) installed 
x Apache Ant 
x JMF API 
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To get the sources, we can download the subversion (svn) sources by opening a console and 
typing:  
#>svn checkout svn://svn.berlios.de/imscommunicator/trunk/ims-
communicator 
The JMF binaries are not shipped with the source code because of their size. Still, they 
are not necessary for the basic functioning of this project; they enable to realize voice calls. 
They can be downloaded as a separated package. As for the project sources, we just have to 
open a console and write:  
#>svn checkout svn://svn.berlios.de/imscommunicator/trunk/ims-
communicator/trunk/lib 
There’s support for Linux and Windows.  Thus,  as  we  develop  on  a  Linux platform 
(needed to install the IMS environment), we download the corresponding package and 
place it in the lib folder inside the IMS Communicator project as represented in the Figure 
3-8.  
 
Figure 3-8. JMF libraries [33] 
Configuration 
The configuration of IMS Communicator consists in indicating the public identity of the 
user and the IMS environment that he belongs. All these values can be changed manually in 
the file “ims-communicator.xml”. Most of the fields are already well configured by 
default; some particular fields have to be filled according to the IMS environment 
configured to enter the user identity and the address of the IMS Proxy. 
Sip: 
<PUBLIC_ADDRESS value=sip:bob@open-ims.test/> 
<REGISTRAR_ADDRESS value="open-ims.test" /> 
<DEFAULT_DOMAIN_NAME value="open-ims.test" />  
<DEFAULT_AUTHENTICATION_REALM value="open-ims.test" /> 
<OUTBOUND_PROXY value="pcscf.open-ims.test:4060/udp"   /> 
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Ims: 
<PRIVATE_ADDRESS value="bob@open-ims.test" /> 
<USE_IPSEC value="false" />  
<AUTH_ALGORITHM value="MD5" />  
 
Common : 
<PREFERRED_NETWORK_INTERFACE value="lo" />  
<PREFERRED_NETWORK_ADDRESS value="10.1.22.101" />  
To launch the project, in the folder /ims-communicator launch: 
#>ant rebuild 
Some mistakes may appear which lead to a "BUILD FAILED". It may be necessary to open 
the files concerned add a library 
#>vim /ims-
communicator/src/net/java/sip/communicator/sip/simple/XmlPresenceInfor
mationFactory.java 
 
import net.java.sip.communicator.common.Console; 
 
#>vim ims-
communicator/src/net/java/sip/communicator/sip/simple/storage/ContactL
istSerializer.java  
 
import net.java.sip.communicator.common.Console; 
After this, the command ant rebuild should  lead  to  a  "BUILD  SUCCESSFUL".  To  
launch the client, we just have to write: 
#>ant run 
A IMS Communicator window appears and we can register the user whom information is 
detailed in the file "ims-communicator.xml". 
3.3 Application Servers 
3.3.1 Different Application servers 
An AS is a server that communicates through SIP and DIAMETER interfaces in order to 
provide services that can vary from basic telephony services to advanced multimedia 
services. There are different application servers. Some of them are open source and the 
others  are  developed  by  vendors.  The  most  well  known  open  source  ASs  are  Mobicents, 
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OpenSIPs, Sailfin, Asterisk. Some of them are C-based such as OpenSIP and some of them 
java-based such as SailFin. Basically, they are SIP application containers. They provide to 
the  developers  the  possibility  to  deploy  their  application  to  be  used  by  the  IMS  Clients  
through the IMS architecture. We have chosen as AS, SailFin project [34] because it is an 
open source, java-based AS and because we wanted to develop an application based on SIP 
Servlet technology. SailFin provides the possibility to deploy SIP applications.  
3.3.2 SailFin Application Server 
SailFin project is based on robust and scalable SIP Servlets technology on top of a 
deployment-quality, Java EE-based GlassFish.  This  project  is  contributed  by  Ericsson.  
SailFin, currently, provides JSR 289 compatibility, high- availability, and clustering, and is 
integrated with the existing GlassFish services. It adds the SIP Servlet Container based on 
JSR 289 to GlassFish. Given the functionality, the SailFin codebase requires GlassFish as 
its underlying runtime. In the Figure 3-9 we can find the module architecture of SailFin. As 
we already mentioned, the Project SailFin provides a SIP Container for deploying SIP 
applications and a Web container for deploying different WEB applications.  
 
Figure 3-9. SailFin Architecture 
The SailFin project offers a Web console for administration purposes. This is shown in 
the Figure 3-10. This Web console offers the possibility to configure different parameters 
such as SIP listening ports and HTTP listening ports. Deploying a SIP Servlet Application 
becomes even easier with the Web administration console. 
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Figure 3-10. WEB administration console 
3.3.3 Installation and configuration of SailFin 
In this section we describe the general procedure how to provision any application server 
within OSIMS infrastructure. We describe how to install and configure SailFin. Later on, 
we explain how to deploy and run a SIP Servlet application on SailFin.  First,  we start  by 
describing the SailFin installation and configuration. SailfinV2 can be found in [35]. Once 
we downloaded the source code we can extract the archive.  
#>java -Xmx256m -jar sailfin-installer-v2-b31g-Linux.jar 
#>cd sailfin 
We can edit the file “setup.xml” according to our needs and then we can build and run 
SailFin. For instance, we have named the domain as “domain1” and have started it and the 
database as follows:   
#>chmod -R +x lib/ant/bin 
#>lib/ant/bin/ant -f setup.xml 
#>./bin/asadmin start-domain domain1 
#>./bin/asadmin start-database 
The next step in the configuration of SailFin consists in changing the default SIP 
listener and external ports. SIP listener are ports on which SIP Servlets listen to incoming 
SIP requests and external ports are ports from which it sends outgoing requests. The ports 
for SIP traffic and HTTP traffic have to be chosen carefully in order not to be in conflict 
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with the ports already dedicated to the IMS components. The configuration can be changed 
through web interface, by default on port 4848, or from the console with the usage of 
asadmin tool.  
After having installed and configured SailFin we can easily deploy the SIP Servlet 
applications.  All we need is to open a web interface and navigate through: Common Tasks 
ĺ Applications ĺ Converged SIP Modules ĺ Deploy and specify the following: 
x Location – path to the application war, on local file system 
x Application name – any application name 
x Status enabled – on, automatically starts the application 
x Run verifier – on 
 
We can use the command line version by using the “build.xml” application file. For this 
we enter in the application directory and use ant after having compile the application. 
#>cd /sailfin/samples/sipservlet/Identity 
#>ant compile 
#>ant deploy 
The SailFin instance hosts SIP Servlet application and is ready to be plugged into IMS 
infrastructure. We will describe the procedure to provision the application server supporting 
ISC interface within Open Source IMS Core infrastructure when we will discuss about the 
implementation of the project in the section 4.3.  
3.4 Tools used 
3.4.1 Wireshark 
Wireshark [36] is an open source network packet analyzer. It captures network packets and 
tries to display that packet data as detailed as possible. Some of its different features are: 
x capturing live packet data from a network interface 
x displaying packets with detailed protocol information  
x opening and save packet data capture 
x filtering packets on criteria (protocol, source, destination)  
x searching for packets in many criteria 
x showing the call flow of messages between different entities communicating 
In this work, these tools were very useful because they enabled us to observe every SIP 
message sent between the different entities and help us to debug the program. The 
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installation  is  traditional.  We  can  download  the  software  from  the  website  or  we  can  
download it via Linux package synaptic manager:  
#>apt-get update 
#>apt-get install wireshark  
Once the Wireshark is installed, we can launch it from a window. With Wireshark, one 
has the possibility to capture on one of the different network interfaces. As in this project 
we have installed everything in one box, we selected the loopback interface. 
By default, Wireshark does not interpret the DIAMETER protocol. If the DIAMETER 
messages are not present on the traces then it is probably because the used ports in the 
OSIMS haven’t  been  associated  to  the  protocol.  In  order  to  associate  them one  has  to  go  
through: 
Edit > Preferences > Protocols > Diameter  
Set up the DIAMETER TCP ports = 3868,3869,3870 
Wireshark offers the possibility to have a better view of the trace captured. This is the 
coloring  rules.  You  can  also  write  your  coloring  rules  in  a  file  and  then  import  it  to  
Wireshark.  
View > Coloring Rules 
3.4.2 Eclipse IDE 
Eclipse [37] is a multi-language software development environment written in Java. It is 
composed of an integrated development environment and an extensible plug-in system. It 
helps us to develop applications in Java and other languages (C/C++, python, php) thanks 
to its numerous functions: syntax coloration, completion, debug, project management…). 
The installation of this software is also traditional: it can be found on the website or can be 
downloaded for console writing:  
#>apt-get update 
#>apt-get install eclipse  
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4 Implementing a secured identity exchange based 
on IMS 
In this chapter, we will present the concrete implementation of the secured identity SIP 
exchange mechanism presented in the section 2.7. We will first describe the way the work 
was organized and shared. Then, we will describe more in detail the different parts of the 
implementation. The first task deals with the modification of the IMS Client, which 
presents the different functions created in the IMS Communicator open source client. Then, 
we will present the principle of filter criteria on the HSS. We will finish with the 
development of a SIP Servlet application for securing the identity exchange in the AS. The 
reader can find in the Appendix E how to test the project on his own platform.  
4.1 Organization of the work 
This project was done as joint thesis. The most logical way to implement this project was to 
process step by step, making sure that the previous step worked before trying to develop the 
other step. We followed the message flow presented in the project in the Section 2.7. These 
are  the  main  steps  of  this  implementation.  They  are  not  ordered  in  time,  because  as  
previously mentioned, they were realized in a parallel way: 
A. Modify the first INVITE message sent by the caller 
B. Modify the behavior of the different SIP servers in the IMS Core Network towards 
the new headers present in the incoming message 
C. Implement an SIP Servlet application responsible for assuring the identity exchange 
on the S-CSCF 
D. Modify the behavior of the callee towards this modified message 
A representation of this planning is presented in the Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1. Planning of the project 
Concretely, we divided the work in two, so that we could work in parallel. 
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4.1.1 Caroline: Modification of the IMS Client 
Caroline’s work was about changing the behavior of the IMS Communicator used as the 
IMS client. She first implemented the exchange identity mechanism only between two IMS 
clients: UserA and UserB.  In  this  first  step,  the  IMS  Core  Network  didn’t  check  the  
identities and just forwarded the messages to the addressee. Moreover, in this simple case, 
UserA and UserB belonged to the same domain. 
x Task A: Its representation is given in the Figure 4-2. 
 
a. UserA adds his identity and his signature in the first message “INVITE” 
b. The core IMS just forwards it to UserB 
 
Figure 4-2. Task A: UserA sends a request INVITE to UserB 
x Task D: Its representation is given in the Figure 4-3. 
 
c. UserB verifies the identity and the signature sent by UserA and adds its own 
identity and signature in the SIP response message 
d. The core IMS just forwards it to UserA who checks UserB’s identity and saves 
it 
  
Figure 4-3. Task D: UserB answers to UserA's INVITE message 
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In this case, the implementation is not final: UserB was not supposed to know the 
identity of UserA. It is the server which is supposed to check UserA’s identity and 
signature, and then add his own identity and signature that UserB checks. But, at this state 
of the project, the fact that UserB is able to check UserA’s identity is a good point. When 
the IMS Core Network would take charge of processing of UserA’s new message headers 
(after the steps B-C), it would very easy to switch UserB to verify the server’s identity 
rather than UserA’s identity. 
4.1.2 Gerti: Modification of the Core Network and AS 
Gerti’s work was about the modification of the IMS Core Network and the installation of 
an Application Server (tasks B-C). The AS is one element that does not exist by default in 
the OSIMS project,  so  he  had  to  first  familiarize  himself  with  this  entity,  and  the  
technologies associated. Firstly, he started by installing and configuring a basic AS which 
could communicate with the OSIMS (task  D).  The  next  step  was  the  modification  of  the  
different filters at the level of the S-CSCF so that the SIP messages containing specific 
headers could be forwarded to the AS (task C). Once the task A was completed (the IMS 
Client sends a SIP INVITE with specific headers containing UserA’s identity), the test and 
sign functions specific to the servers could be implemented in a SIP application deployed in 
the AS. In this case, UserA and UserB still belonged to the same domain.  
x Tasks  B  &  C: Its representation is given in the Figure 4-4. The steps already 
implemented in the previous steps are represented in grey; the new implementations 
are in black. 
 
 Figure 4-4. Tasks B & C: Implementation of the AS 
a. Based  on  the  iFC,  the  S-CSCF  detects  the  specific  headers  (containing  the  
caller’s identity and signature) and forwards the message to the AS. 
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b. The AS realizes the tests of user’s identity and signature. When this user’s 
information is verified, it adds its own identity and signature (or rather, the ones 
of the home operator) and forwards the message to the S-CSCF. 
c. The server forwards it to the proxy which forwards it to UserB. 
d. UserB is modified to check the server’s identity and signature, and if they are 
verified, he saves UserA’s identity. 
Then, the mechanism has a similar functioning in the opposite way: UserB creates the 
SIP response and adds his own identity and signature, forwards the message to the P-CSCF 
proxy, which forwards it to the S-CSCF. This one, detecting the specific headers, sends the 
message  to  the  AS.  This  one  checks  UserB’s identity and signature, and then returns the 
message so that it can be forwarded to UserA: S-CSCF -> P-CSCF -> UserA. 
4.1.3 Next step: Creation of two domain operators 
Once the mechanism tested for one operator domain with two users, it is interesting to 
implement a scenario where the two SIP users belong to two different domains. In this case, 
the roaming agreement between the home operators is necessary to carry the SIP signaling 
through the two networks. We could implement a way to apply the principles of the 
roaming agreement: the servers have to add and verify their identities and signatures. So, 
the  interesting  thing  in  this  scenario  is  that  it  comes  closer  to  the  real  situation  that  we  
described in the chapter 4.4. 
 
Figure 4-5. Request INVITE between two users belonging to different domains  
A representation of this implementation is given in the Figure 4-5. 
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a) After consultation of the I-CSCF, the server forwards it to the addressee’s home 
network  (UserB belonging to DomainB). The message goes through the network, 
reaches the proxy and is forwarded to the addressee’s serving server: S-CSCF_B. 
b) Based on the iFC, the server S-CSCF_B detects the specific headers (containing the 
caller’s home operator identity and signature), and forwards the message to the 
second domain AS. 
c) As  the  home  operator  of  the  addressee  (DomainB)  has  a  roaming  agreement  with  
the caller’s home operator (DomainA),  the  AS (belonging  to  DomainB) can check 
its identity and its signature. Then, it returns the message to the UserB’s S-CSCF. 
d) The server sends it to the proxy P-CSCF_B which forwards it to UserB. 
Then, the process works exactly in the same fashion in the opposite way. This is presented 
in the Figure 4-6.  
 
Figure 4-6. Answer to an INVITE between two users belonging to different domains 
a) UserB checks his server’s identity and signature, and if they are verified, he saves 
UserA’s identity. Then he creates a new SIP response adding his own identity and 
signature. 
b) UserB’s identity and signature are checked by the server in DomainB, and if they 
are verified, the identity and signature of DomainB are added. 
c) The message is forwarded to UserA’s home operator, the DomainA. 
d) The identity and signature of DomainB are verified, and if they are, the identity and 
signature of DomainA are added. 
e) The message is forwarded to UserA, which checks his server’s identity and 
signature and, if they are verified, he saves UserB’s information. 
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4.2 Modification of the IMS Client 
As previously explained, we chose to develop the IMS Communicator client to implement 
the project. Before any modifications, the client was able to register to the IMS Core and 
have a multimedia call with another IMS client. All the features and functionalities 
proposed by this client can be found in [7]. 
In this project, we needed to modify the behavior of the client according to the secure 
exchange of identities mechanism previously described in [9]. “Modifying its behavior” 
means modifying the SIP messages that the client sends at different steps of its operation: 
1) when sending an INVITE request (UserA  in the Task A) 
2) when receiving an INVITE request modified (UserB in the Task A) 
3) when sending a response to the INVITE request (UserB in the Task D) 
4) when receiving this response (UserA in the Task D) 
For all of these steps, the same methodology was employed to implement the changes: 
x understanding  the  IMS  client  way  of  working.  This  means  which  classes  and  
methods are used in this step 
x changing the code to apply the modification 
x testing the new code and analyzing the messages sent using the log files and 
Wireshark 
4.2.1 Sending an INVITE request 
The first step was to find “where” the message INVITE was  produced  in  the  IMS  client.  
This means, which classes and which methods were involved when a user wants to call 
another user. For this purpose, the easiest way was to analyze the log files. All the actions 
performed by IMS Communicator are recorded in a specific file that can be founded in the 
folder “/log”. However, to see all the debug information, we had to modify a parameter in 
the file “ims-communicator.xml” and set the trace level, which was fixed by default at 16 
(stack log), to 32 (stack log + debug log). 
 
<TRACE_LEVEL value="32" /> 
 
A new log file “ims-communicator.debug.log” appeared in the folder “/log”. We 
found out that when the client sends an “INVITE” request, the creation of the message was 
realized by the method Invite in the class “/ims-
communicator/src/net/java/sip/communicator/sip/CallProcessing.java”. 
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We could see in the “INVITE” method that to create the different headers that compose 
the “INVITE” message, we always had to follow the same logic:  
x create the header (for a new header use “javax.sip.header.ExtensionHeader”) 
x test if the header’s syntax was correct 
x add the header created to the object of type “javax.sip.Request” called  
“INVITE”. 
For the sake of commodity, we created a new java class which contains all the 
necessary functions to calculate and verify the different identities and the all the attributes 
of the client: “Security_ims_project_tools.java”. This class is situated in the 
directory: “/ims-communicator/src/net/java/sip/communicator/sip/security”  
We created two functions for calculating the HIT (GETHIT) and the signature 
(GETSIGNATURE), and some other auxiliary functions (GETPUBLICKEY, GETPRIVATEKEY) and 
parameters (String algorithm=”SHA-1”, PublicKey, PrivateKey):  
METHOD GETHIT 
The method GETHIT takes in parameter the client’s Public key, applies a SHA1 function 
and returns a String which contains the hash code generated: HIT. The HIT is defined as the 
cryptographic identifier, and is get from the hash on the public key.  
We previously had generated different pairs of public/private keys for each entity: 
Alice, Bob, Server_Alice and Server_Bob. For example, for Bob, we created two files: 
“public_key_file_bob” and “private_key_file_bob” containing the corresponding 
cryptographic keys that we placed in the root folder (“/ims-communicator”).  
These cryptographic keys, which were saved in files, are then read by the function 
GETPUBLICKEY. This method takes in parameter the localization of the file containing the 
key, and returns an object of the type “PublicKey” defined in the package 
“java.security”.  
Then, we used the functions defined with the object 
“java.security.MessageDigest” to  create  the  Hash  of  the  public  key.  It  is  in  the  
creation of this object that the variable “algorithm=SHA-1” was  used  to  define  the  
hash algorithm.  
METHOD GETSIGNATURE  
In the method GETSIGNATURE, we create the signature associated to the HIT. This signature 
is calculated creating a hash of several parameters present in the message, and then by 
ciphering it with the private key.  
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We use the Object “java.security.Signature”, initialize it with the object 
“java.security.PrivateKey” obtained thanks to the method GETPRIVATEKEY (similar 
functioning than GETPUBLICKEY). Then, we update it with the different parameters so that it 
can generate a signature associated. 
Once  these  functions  defined,  we  can  create  the  new  headers  (objects  of  type  
“javax.sip.header.ExtensionHeader”) and add them in the message “INVITE”. For 
each header, we just need the name and the value associated: 
x “P-End-Pub-Identity”: represents the identity that the client wants to 
communicate. Its value is copied from the header “From” (client’s sip address) 
x “P-End-Pub-Identity-Info”: represents the cryptographic identity of the client, it 
contains the HIT. The value associated is obtained with the function GETHIT. 
x “P-End-Identity”: represents the signature associated to the HIT. Its value is 
obtained with the function GETSIGNATURE. 
 
After these modifications, we can check with Wireshark and  from  the  logs  that  the  
modifications have been taken into account. Indeed, we can see in the Figure 4-7 a message 
“INVITE” with these three new headers issued from the log files. 
 
 
 
This “INVITE” request is received by the SIP servers of the IMS Core, which forward it 
to the addressee. The reception of this request is described in the next section. 
Figure 4-7. Request INVITE modified (sent in the Task A) 
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4.2.2 Receiving a modified INVITE request  
Using the same methodology as previously, we discovered that it was the function 
“ProcessInvite” from the class “CallProcessing.java” which  took  in  charge  the  
message “INVITE” received. When the client (UserB) receives the message “INVITE” 
modified, he has to check the identity of UserA (his HIT) and the signature associated. 
We created 2 new functions in the class 
“Security_ims_project_tools.java” (VERIFYHIT and VERIFYSIGNATURE), and 
the annex methods (EXTRACTHITUSER, EXTRACTALGUSER) and parameters (PublicKey 
public_key_UserA, Boolean hit_verified=false, Boolean 
signature_verified=false) 
METHOD VERIFYHIT  
The method VERIFYHIT takes in parameter the public key file containing the real saved 
identity of the sender (UserA) and the header containing the hit in the message “INVITE” 
received. It recalculates the real hit, and compares the hit received: if they correspond, it 
returns a Boolean “true”. 
First, the client UserB calculates the real HIT corresponding to the sender thanks to the 
public key of UserA previously saved in the folder “/ims-communicator” of UserB.  
Then, he takes the value of the header “P_end_pub_identity_info” and applies the 
functions EXTRACTHITUSER and EXTRACTALGUSER to obtain the values of the HIT and the 
algorithm associated.  
Finally, the function compares these two values (hit expected, hit received) and returns 
a Boolean “true” if they correspond each other. 
METHOD VERIFYSIGNATURE 
The method VERIFYSIGNATURE takes in parameter the public key file and several fields 
composing the header, it decodes the signature applying the public key on the data with 
which the signature was generated. 
In  this  function,  we  take  advantage  of  the  methods  proposed  with  the  Object  of  type  
“java.security.Signature”. Indeed, the function VERIFY enables to check if the 
Signature proposed really corresponds to this one expected. The function 
VERIFYSIGNATURE returns its result as a Boolean equals to “true” when the signature is 
verified. 
If the result of these two functions equals to true, we could change the value of the two 
Booleans created in the file “CallProcessing.java”: “hit_verified” and 
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“signature_verified” to “true”. These states would enable to later modify the answer 
to the INVITE, described in the next point. 
Moreover, we save in a file the value of the header “P_end_pub_identity” which 
contains the identity that UserA wants to communicate to UserB. For example, if Bob sends 
the message “INVITE” to Alice, Alice creates a file “sip:bob@open-ims.test” in  
“/ims-communicator” which contains: 
<urn:hit:05fdbb0ebdb05125b9a5934b5fec9676a6ebbc2c>;alg=SHA-1.  
4.2.3 Answering to the modified INVITE request  
For this step, the function SAYOK in the file “CallProcessing.java” is invoked. 
This function is called when UserB accepts to answer the call. The corresponding message 
is the fourth “200 OK” message sent. It is important not to add the secured identity in the 
previous “200 OK” as they are generated before accepting the call. 
 
 
 
As previously said, the UserB client  first  verifies  the  values  of  “hit_verified” and 
“signature_verified”.  If  they  are  both  fixed  at  true,  which  means  that  the  identity  of  
the sender is verified, UserB has create a new SIP message based on this one received. He 
copies and pastes all the headers (like “From”, “To”, “Call-Id”) and replaces the value of 
CSeq: 1 INVITE 
From: "bob" <sip:bob@open-ims.test>;tag=742565912 
To: <sip:alice@open-ims.test> 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 
10.1.22.101:5080;branch=z9hG4bKc7f87fe5f3ba6c1699aee27d64b02086 
Max-Forwards: 70 
Contact: <sip:bob@10.1.22.101:5080> 
Route: <sip:pcscf.open-ims.test:4060;transport=udp>, 
<sip:orig@scscf.open-ims.test:6060;lr> 
Allow: INVITE,ACK,CANCEL,BYE,MESSAGE,PRACK,UPDATE 
P-Preferred-Identity: <sip:bob@open-ims.test> 
Supported: 100rel,precondition,early-session 
P-Access-Network-Info: IEEE-802.11 
User-Agent: IMS-Communicator 081209 
Date_sent: Tue Jun 29 22:13:56 EEST 2010 
P-End-Pub-Identity: sip:alice@open-ims.test 
P-End-Identity: 
302c0214335b5eef8f024529a69df25ee98e88811c5242d6021454e98142de3ab671
be683038f901c39d55ece62f 
P-End-Pub-Identity-Info: 
<urn:hit:719a95029058615c2b07e5b70f137ac11e95e163>;alg=SHA-1 
 
Figure 4-8. Response to the request INVITE modified (Task D, c) 
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the headers “P_end_pub_identity”, “P_end_pub_identity_info” and 
“P_end_identity” filled by UserA’s information, by his own information. This is 
basically the same operation than this one that UserA did when he modified the “INVITE” 
Message. 
After these modifications, we can check with Wireshark and from the logs that the 
modifications have been taken into account, and that the answer to the “INVITE” presents 
three new headers updated. This can be seen in the Figure 4-8, issued from the logs. This 
response  is  sent  to  the  IMS  Core  which  forwards  it  to  the  Caller  UserA. Its behavior is 
described in the next section. 
4.2.4 Receiving the response to its request INVITE 
For this step, it is the function PROCESSINVITEOK in the file “CallProcessing.java” 
which is invoked. In this case, UserA does exactly the same than UserB has just done. This 
means, he verifies UserB’s identity and signature and save UserB’s identity. Then, to start 
the direct communication, he sends an ACK2 message to UserB, containing his HIT. This 
is a simple UDP message sent to the IP address of the UserB that contains the identities of 
the UserA. The reason of this message is to indicate the identity of the UserA directly to the 
UserB.  Once  receiving  the  UDP message,  the  UserB verifies the identity received in this 
message with the identity that he has already saved during the SIP exchange. This is 
another mechanism in order to improve the identity exchange and permit the user to have a 
better certainty about the identity of its counterpart.  
4.2.5 Clients’ final modifications 
As previously described, after these modifications, the mechanism was still basic between 
the two users; the server didn’t take part in the process. However, the functions required 
only small modifications to make the users verify their operators’ identities rather than the 
other SIP user’s one. Indeed, in the code, there is just a variable which takes in 
consideration the value of the hit and another for the signature. Rather than taking the value 
of the hit of the user (in the header “P-End-Info-Identity”),  we  changed  it  so  that  it  
could now take the server’s hit (in the header “Identity-Info”) and signature (in the 
header “Identity”). We also realized three new methods: EXTRACTHITSERVER, 
EXTRACTALGSERVER, and EXTRACTNAMESERVER. In these headers, there is also information 
about the name of the home operator: we created a new function in the class 
“Security_ims_project_tools.java”: VERIFYNAME. Finally, the modified IMS client 
uses new attributes and main methods, all defined in the file 
“Security_ims_project_tools.java” and described in the Table 2. 
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IMS Client – UserA 
Attributes:  
 
- (Public Key) Client itself - UserA 
- (Private Key) Client itself - UserA 
- (Public Key) UserA’s home operator 
- (String) Algorithm used for the 
authentication 
- (Boolean) hit_verified 
- (Boolean) signature_verified 
- (String) Name of home operator 
 
Methods: 
- String GetHIT 
- String GetSignature 
- Boolean VerifyHit 
- Boolean VerifySignature 
- Boolean VerifyName 
Auxiliary methods: 
- PublicKey GetPublicKey 
- PrivateKey GetPrivateKey 
- String extractHitServer 
- String extractAlgServer 
- String extractNameServer 
Table 2 Attributes and Methods defined in “Security_ims_project_tools.java” 
These are the main modifications that we applied to the IMS Communicator client to 
implement the secured identity exchange mechanism. There are still some auxiliary 
methods that we needed to implement but those aren’t very important for the 
comprehension of the project. These classes realize basic functions, as calculations or 
translations, and are used by more important classes. The next sections focus on the 
implementation related to the IMS Core (Tasks B&C). 
4.3 Filter Criteria on the HSS 
After the short introduction to the initial Filter Criteria concept presented in the chapter 
2.2.4, we continue by presenting the modifications that we have done to implement our 
own iFC. Of course before starting we should make sure that the OSIMS infrastructure is 
set up and running. We verified this by analyzing the traffic with a network analyzer such 
as Wireshark.  
The purpose of this iFC would be to invoke an AS, as shown in the Figure 4-9, when 
the S-CSCF receives SIP INVITE requests that contain some particular headers such as 
“Pub-End-Identity”,  “P-End-Identity-Info”,  “Identity” or “Identity-Info”. 
Actually these headers are respectively the signature of the SIP entities sending the 
message and their identity. We described earlier how these headers are calculated. The SIP 
entities can be SIP users or the S-CSCF.  
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Figure 4-9. AS Invocation [38] 
As we mentioned before, the role of the SIP application that we developed is to verify 
the identity and the signature of the SIP entity when a SIP “INVITE” message arrives to the 
S-CSCF. Then, to add the identity of this S-CSCF in the “INVITE” message and fianlly do 
the same task when the callee sends the SIP response to the previous SIP “INVITE” request.  
For these reasons we created an iFC and then integrated it to the user profiles in order to 
benefit from this application. The FHoSS web interface, listening by default on port 8080, 
helped us to do all the configurations needed. We went through different steps in order to 
configure the iFC. All the configurations presented below needs to be done in admin mode 
through the FHoSS web interface available on http://127.0.0.1:8080. 
Firstly, we added a new application server. For that we needed to specify its address in 
the form of SIP URI and the default behavior of the S-CSCF in case of connection failures. 
This is done through: Servicesĺ Application Servers ĺ Create and specify the 
following values. As examples, we provide the names we have used in our iFC. 
x “Name” – any unique name. Example: “sailfin” 
x “Server Name” – it  must be a valid SIP URI which resolves to application server 
address. Example “sip:sailfin.open-ims.test:41981” 
x “Diameter FQDN” – fully qualified domain name. Example: “sailfin.open-
ims.test” 
x “Default Handling” – default behavior of the S-CSCF in case of connection 
errors. Example: “Session – Continued” 
x “Service-Info” – required, if used by the application. 
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Secondly, we had to create a service profile. This step is a little bit more complicated 
than adding an application server. In order to create a service profile we need to perform 
the following three steps: 
x create Trigger Point 
x create Initial Filter Criteria 
x create Service Profile itself 
Trigger point defines a set of conditions under which particular SIP request is 
forwarded to the AS. Particular conditions are provided by Service Point Triggers (SPTs) in 
the form of the regular expression. The Trigger Point is created through: Services ĺ 
Trigger Pointsĺ Create and specify the following values: 
x “Name” – any unique name. Example: “SailfinTP” 
x “Condition Type” – logic by which SPTs are evaluated. Example :“Disjunctive 
Normal Forme” 
After this we specified the set of appropriate SPTs constituting this Trigger Point (TP) 
and provided optional list of already existing iFC to which this Trigger Point is attached. 
The Figure 4-10 shows how the TP of the iFC that we have configured in order to invoke 
the application we developed looks like.  
 
Figure 4-10. Identity Filter Criteria 
Initial Filter Criteria defines a correlation between a set of Trigger Points and particular 
application server responsible for the execution of the associated service. The IMS 
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standards specify that iFC can have from one to “n” attached Trigger Points. In the FOKUS 
OSIMS implementation there can be only one. So generally in order to create iFC we need 
to specify the previously created Trigger Point and desired application server address. For 
this we navigate through: Services ĺ Initial Filter Criteria ĺ Create and 
specify the following values: 
x “Name” – any unique name, Example “SailfinFilter” 
x “Trigger Point” – name of the already existing Trigger Point, Example 
“SailfinTP” 
x “Application Server” – application server name, Example: “sailfin” 
x “Profile Part Indicator” – specifies the registration state condition for criteria 
evaluation. 
Then we created a Service Profile and assigned to it a prioritized list of iFC including 
the  one  just  created.  If  no  iFC  is  specified,  then  this  Service  Profile  will  not  invoke  any  
service logic and all requests would be processed without evaluation. In our case, the 
service profile is shown in the Figure 4-11. For creating a Service Profile we navigate 
through: Services ĺ Service Profilesĺ Create and specify the following values: 
x “Name” – any unique name, Example: “default_sp”  
x “IFCs” – set of attached Initial Filter Criterias. Example: “SailfinFilter” 
 
Figure 4-11. Service Profile 
As the FHoSS, by default, comes provisioned with a couple of sample users, we didn’t 
create new user accounts. If this is needed, it can be done very easily through the FHoSS 
WEB interface. 
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Finally, we activated a Service Profile for a particular user by assigning it to one of his 
IMPU’s (Public User Identity). The user can be found by navigating through User 
Identitiesĺ Public User Identityĺ Search. Then we just set the Service Profile 
field with the appropriate value. In the Figure 4-12 is shown the configuration in our 
example.  
 
Figure 4-12. User Profile 
Now that we have finished configuring an iFC we are ready to test it using the 
appropriate IMPU with the services hosted on the application server. In the next section we 
introduce the SIP Servlet application that we have developed. 
4.4 Developing a SIP application for securing the identity 
exchange 
The aim of this part of the project was to implement a module in the S-CSCF. We already 
have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter the role of this module. This module can be 
implemented directly by modifying the code of the S-CSCF or can be implemented as a SIP 
application and then deployed in the AS. Knowing that the S-CSCF is coded in C, if we had 
chosen this way of doing, then we would have had to code in C and would have spent a lot 
of time in understanding the sources code of this server. In other words, it was easier to 
develop a SIP application rather than to modify the code of the S-CSCF. At the same time, 
implementing this module directly in the S-CSCF would mean that this SIP server would 
have to support all the added burden coming from the amount of users that want to perform 
a call with identity exchange.  
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We decided to implement this module by developing a SIP application based on SIP 
Servlet technology and then deploying it on the SailFin AS. By this way we have a “plug 
and  play”  solution  that  can  be  deployed  easily  in  another  AS  and  be  used  in  other  IMS  
platforms. We chose SailFin as an application server because it is a Java-based AS that 
provides SIP Servlet container. Moreover, this solution helps to delegate the added burden 
to the AS and to maintain the performances of the S-CSCF.  
4.4.1 Overview of the SIP Servlet application  
In  this  section  we  will  explain  the  SIP  application  and  the  java  classes  that  we  have  
developed. This application is based on a SIP Servlet and follows all the requirements of a 
SIP Servlet application.  In the Table 3 the reader can find the file structure of the SIP 
application developed named “identity”. 
 
File Description 
WEB-INF/ Configuration and executable files of the SIP application are in 
this directory.  
WEB-INF/sip.xml The SIP Servlet-defined configuration file for the SIP application. 
WEB-INF/web.xml The Java EE standard configuration file for the Web application. 
WEB-INF/classes Store compiled class files in the directory. Both HTTP and SIP 
servlets can be stored in this directory. 
WEB-INF/lib Store class files archived as Jar files in the directory.  
Table 3 SIP Application file structure 
Both “sip.xml” and “web.xml” have similar information except <servlet-mapping> 
setting. Another difference between the “sip.xml” and “web.xml” is that in “web.xml” 
we  can  specify  a  servlet  associated  with  the  file  name  portion  of  URL.  But  SIP  has  no  
concept of the file name. Filter conditions can be set using URI or the header field of a SIP 
request. The following “sip.xml” example shows that a SIP Servlet called “identity” is 
assigned all “INVITE” methods. 
<sip-app> 
    <display-name>SIP Identity</display-name> 
    <description>SIP Identity application</description> 
    <servlet> 
        <servlet-name>identity</servlet-name> 
        <description>Identity SIP servlet</description> 
        <servlet-class>com.ericsson.sip.IdentityServlet</servlet-
class> 
        <load-on-startup>1</load-on-startup> 
    </servlet> 
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    <servlet-mapping> 
        <servlet-name>identity</servlet-name> 
        <pattern> 
            <or> 
                <equal> 
                    <var ignore-case="false">request.method</var> 
                    <value>INVITE</value> 
                </equal> 
            </or> 
        </pattern> 
    </servlet-mapping> 
</sip-app> 
As the  iFC we configured  in  the  previous  section,  sends  to  the  AS all  “INVITE” SIP 
messages that contain the specific headers, the application that we developed should have a 
SIP Servlet responsible for receiving the “INVITE” messages. The SIP Servlet “identity” 
extends the “javax.servlet.sip.SipServlet” class  and  implements  the  
“javax.servlet.Servlet” interface. It overrides the DOINVITE method. This application 
is responsible for: 
x receiving all the “INVITE” requests forwarded by the S-CSCF according to the iFC 
x verifying if  the request comes from a SIP user or from a S-CSCF of another IMS 
domain  
x verifying the sender identity of the message and his signature. If the sender is a SIP 
user that has already been registered in the domain, the application will have to 
identify its identity based on the Public Key of that user and his signature based on 
the headers present on the message. We assume that the S-CSCF is in possession of 
the Public Key of the user. If the message comes from another operator, based on 
the trust that the operators have between them, the identity and the signature of the 
S-CSCF of that operator is verified. The operators have previously exchanged their 
Public Identities.  
x adding the S-CSCF identity and signature 
x forwarding the message to the S-CSCF 
The  SIP  Servlet  application  has  to  deal  in  the  same  fashion  with  the  response  of  the  
“INVITE” message  sent  by  the  callee  to  the  caller.  The  servlet  we  developed,  also  has  to  
override the DORESPONSE method.  In  this  case  we  don’t  need  to  create  a  specific  iFC,  
because every response follows the same path as the request, so they are directly forwarded 
from the S-CSCF to the AS.   
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4.4.2 Identity exchange SIP Servlet application 
After this brief introduction of the main functions of the SIP Servlet application, we go 
deeply in details of how we have coded it and present the main java classes and methods 
used.  But  first  of  all,  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  that  this  case  of  study  is  based  on  a  call  
between two IMS user. UserA sends an “INVITE” Request to UserB. We name S-CSCF_A 
the SIP server of UserA and S-CSCF_B the SIP server of UserB. We assumed the case 
where the two users have already been registered in two different IMS domains.  
As already presented in the previous section, the UserA sends his modified “INVITE” 
Request to the UserB.  In  this  Request  there  are  some new headers  such  as  “P-End-Pub-
Identity”, “P-End-Identity-Info” and “P-End-Identity”. When this Request 
arrives to the S-CSCF_A, after having passed through the P-CSCF_A and optionally 
through the I-CSCF_A, it is forwarded to the AS based on the iFC we already configured. 
As the “sip.xml” file indicates, the “INVITE” Request is received by the “identity” 
Servlet, the SIP application developed in this project. In the following code we present the 
structure of the SIP Servlet developed.  
public class IdentityServlet extends SipServlet implements 
 SipErrorListener,Servlet { 
 
  @Override 
  protected void doInvite(SipServletRequest request) throws  
 ServletException, IOException { 
    if(cp.verifyIdentity(request, public_key_file_user,  
 "type_user")==true){ 
      cp.addIdentityS(request, public_key_file_server,    
   private_key_file_server); 
    } 
    Proxy proxy = request.getProxy(); 
    proxy.setSupervised(true); 
    proxy.proxyTo(request.getRequestURI());    
  } 
 
  @Override 
  protected void doResponse(SipServletResponse response)throws 
 ServletException, IOException { 
    if(cp.verifyIdentity(response, 
public_key_file_user,"type_user")==true) 
    { 
      cp.addIdentityS(response, public_key_file_serverA,    
  private_key_file_serverA); 
  } 
  super.doResponse(response); 
}  } } 
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All the auxiliary methods used for verifying or adding the identity and the signature of 
the user or the server are gathered in the “Security_ims_project_tools.java” class in 
the package “com.ericsson.sip.security”. 
The first thing that the Servlet has to do is to know, if the Request came from the SIP 
server of the other domain or if  it  came from one of its  own users.  Let’s assume that the 
application server associated to S-CSCF_A has to check a message “INVITE” coming 
from UserA already registered in the S-CSCF_A.  In  this  case,  the  AS  has  to  check  the  
identity of UserA (his HIT) and the signature associated. These verifications are done 
through the method VERIFYIDENTITY of the “CallProcessing.java” class in the package 
“com.ericsson.sip”. 
METHOD VERIFYIDENTITY  
This method takes as parameters:  
x a SIP message 
x the public key of the SIP entity the request comes from 
x the type of the sender: it can be a IMS user or the S-CSCF of another domain 
 
This  method  verifies  the  identity  and  the  signature  of  the  SIP  entity  with  the  two  
methods that we already presented in the SIP user code. These methods are VERIFYHIT and 
VERIFYSIGNATURE. They are both defined in the “Security_ims_project_tools.java” 
class. If the identity and the signature are verified then the VERIFYIDENTITY returns a 
Boolean “true”.  
Once the verification of the identity and signature are done, S-CSCFA has  to  add  its  
identity and its signature to the SIP “INVITE” message. This is done through the method 
ADDIDENTITYS of the “CallProcessing.java” class. 
METHOD ADDIDENTITYS 
This method takes as parameters:  
x a SIP message   
x the public key of the SIP Server    
x the private key of the SIP Server  
 
This method uses the same methods that we already presented when describing how the 
IMS user adds his identity and his signature to the “INVITE” message. The methods 
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GETHIT and GETSIGNATURE used for creating the identity and the signature of the server are 
also coded in the “Security_ims_project_tools.java” class.   
After this step, the AS has to forward the “INVITE” message to S-CSCF_A which will 
be responsible of forwarding it to S-CSCF_B, the SIP server of the other domain where the 
second IMS user is registered. The Figure 4-13 shows a typical message “INVITE” that is 
sent  from  the  domain  of  UserB=Bob (“domainB”)  to  the  domain  of  UserA=Alice 
(“domainA”).  We can see the identity and the signature of S-CSCF_B (“homeB”)and also 
the identity and the signature of Bob who wants to start the conversation.  
 
Figure 4-13. SIP INVITE from “Domain_B” to “Domain_A” 
Once the “INVITE” message arrives to the S-CSCF_B, it is forwarded to the AS of this 
domain based on the iFC configured. Then the following procedures are in the same 
fashion as before. The difference is that now the S-CSCF_B has to verify the identity and 
the signature of S-CSCF_A and then add his own identity and signature to the headers of 
the message and forward it back to the UserB.  
The SIP Response follows the same path as the SIP “INVITE” Request  and  the  same 
methods were applied in order to verify and add the identities and the signatures of the SIP 
entities. Once the SailFin is installed and configured we can deploy the application through 
the WEB interface or through the “build.xml”.  
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5 Results and discussion 
In  this  part,  we  will  present  the  results  of  the  implementation  of  the  project.  At  the  
beginning we will give general results that have been revealed during this work and then 
we will go through the relevant Wireshark screen  shots  to  analyze  the  different  SIP  
messages. We will analyze step by step the messages transiting in the network through the 
different entities when an IMS user wants to call  another IM Client.  Finally we will  give 
some improvements to be considered for future research.  
5.1 General results  
The mechanisms presented on this work have been evaluated according to their scalability 
aspects. Adding new headers on the SIP messages augment the size of these messages. The 
process of verifying the identity and the signature every time the SIP messages pass 
through a SIP entity generate new calculations and therefore augment the time delay. The 
main problem that the size of the “INVITE” messages can cause is the possibility to switch 
from a UDP datagram to TCP if the UDP datagram is too large. This can be prevented by 
encoding properly the packet. We have analyzed the SIP messages containing the new 
headers. This has shown that the total size of the SIP message does not overpass the 
maximum size of the UDP datagram.  
The result of this work is that the high level architecture presented in order to enhance 
the security aspects of multimedia communications based on IMS architecture and SIP 
exchange is implementable. Nevertheless some scalability aspects such the size of the new 
SIP packets and the time delay has to be taken into account. 
5.2 Packet analysis 
In  our  test  runs,  it  is  Bob  (“sip:bob@open-ims.test”) who calls Alice 
(“sip:alice@open-ims.test”). They both belong to the same domain (“open-
ims.test”) and are already registered. These are the different IP addresses of the entities: 
x Bob: 10.1.22.101 
x Alice: 10.1.22.101 
x P-CSCF: 10.1.2.102 
x I-CSCF: 10.1.2.103 
x S-CSCF: 10.1.2.104 
x AS: 10.1.2.109 
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The Figure 5-1 shows the first “INVITE” message sent by Bob to his proxy (P-CSCF). We 
can see the IMS-specific headers composing the SIP message like “Call-ID”, “CSeq”, 
“From”,” To”, “Via”, “Contact”, “Route” and “Allow”. There are also the identity-
specific headers that we added with the different methods described in the previous section:  
x “Date_sent”: Contains the date when the message was produced. In fact, IMS 
Communicator didn’t create this header by default, so we had to add it.  
x “P-End-Pub-Identity”: Contains the identity that Bob wants to communicate to 
his interlocutor, Alice. 
x “P-End-Pub-Identity-Info”: Contains Bob’s cryptographic identifier (HIT) 
and the algorithm to use to decipher it (ALG) 
x “P-End-Identity”: Contains the Signature protecting the message. 
Then, the proxy just forwards the message to the I-CSCF which consults the database 
HSS to know the S-CSCF associated to Bob. Then it forwards the “INVITE” message to 
it. These two SIP servers don’t do much more than forwarding the message. The headers 
that we use to calculate the signature are not removed nor modified. The proxy just 
modifies the header “Route” to indicate its address for the future answer to pass by him, 
and add some headers that we did not use in this project. As a consequence, the messages 
forwarded by P-CSCF and I-CSCF are quite the same than this one sent in the Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1. Request INVITE : Bob -> P-CSCF 
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The Figure 5-2 shows the “INVITE” message received by the S-CSCF associated to 
Bob. It, according to the iFC, forwards the specific “INVITE” message to the Application 
Server. In the AS is the SIP application responsible for securing the identity exchange. We 
can notice that once again the message hasn’t been modified. Then, the SIP application on 
the AS performs its tasks: check Bob’s identity, and check the authenticity of the message. 
It can accomplish these tasks with the help of the value of the HIT, the algorithm contained 
in the header “P-End-Pub-Identity-Info”, the signature contained in “P-End-
Identity”, and  the  other  headers  used  to  calculate  the  signature.  In  the  Figure  5-3,  the  
application server has finished its controls, and has added its specific headers as the user 
has been identified:  
x “Identity-Info”: Contains the server’s name domain, own HIT (net), and 
algorithm uses in order to obtain the hit. 
x “Identity”: Contains the corresponding signature. 
All the headers previously added are still present in the message. After several 
communications with the I-CSCF of Alice in order to find the C-SCSF associated to Alice, 
Bob’s S-CSCF forwards it to the S-CSCF of Alice. It is assumed that Bob and Alice home 
operators have a pre-established roaming agreement. 
 
Figure 5-2. Request INVITE: S-CSCF_Bob -> AS 
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Figure 5-3. Request INVITE: S-CSCF_Bob -> S-CSCF_Alice 
 
Figure 5-4. Request INVITE: P-CSCF_Alice -> Alice 
In the Figure 5-4, we can see that the SIP Server corresponding to Alice has replaced 
the headers “Identity” and “Identity_Info” with its own information. The information 
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related to Bob’s identity has not been changed. This message is forwarded to Alice who 
checks the headers related to her home operator. Actually, she checks her operator’s hit, 
name, and signature.  
If the identity of the server of Alice is verified by Alice, it means that the message can 
be trusted. The assurance issued by her server about the carried Bob’s identity, enables her 
to trust it too. As a consequence, she saves Bob’s information (hit and address) and answers 
to  Bob’s  request  in  the  4th “200 OK” as shown in the Figure 2-10. This message 
corresponds to the message sent when Alice accepts a call. The Figure 5-5 shows the SIP 
response of Alice to the “INVITE” message. She forwards the message to her P-CSCF. This 
proxy forwards the message to Alice’s S-CSCF. 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Response 200OK: Alice -> PCSCF of Alice 
 
Figure 5-6. Response 200OK:  S-CSCF_Alice -> S-CSCF_Bob 
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In the Figure 5-6, we can see that the process is realized in the opposite direction: still 
through the application server associated, the server of Alice checks Alice identity, and 
then adds its own identity. It forwards the message to the server of Bob, which checks the 
identity of Alice’s server. Then, if this identity is verified, it replaces Alice server specific 
headers with its own information and forwards it to the Bob’s proxy.  
In the Figure 5-7, Bob’s P-CSCF forwards to him the Response “200 OK” coming from 
Alice. It contains Bob’s server and Alice’s identity information. Bob first checks the 
server’s identity fields. If they are verified, it means that it can trust this message, and Alice 
identity which is associated. It saves Alice’s cryptographic identifier (HIT). 
 
Figure 5-7. Response 200OK:  S-CSCF_Bob -> Bob 
Once these different exchanges are performed, Bob and Alice are in possession of their 
respective secured identities, which have been asserted by their own trusted home 
operators. As a consequence, they can start to directly talk together. Their identities have 
been exchanged in a secure way, so they can be sure of their correspondent’s identity. 
5.3 Call Flow 
In this section, we present the message call flow. The Figure 5-8 enables to see an overall 
view of the messages exchanges, the involved entities, and to notice the differences with a 
basic call setup: we can see that there are some messages forwarded to the entity 
“10.1.22.109”, which is the Application Server.  
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Figure 5-8. INVITE Call Flow between Bob and Alice 
5.4 Improvements 
Now that the basic functioning is working, we could implement some enhancements to 
improve this work. First, we could configure this secured exchange identity mechanism as 
an option when launching the Client IMS Communicator. At present, the mechanism is 
automatically activated; the headers are directly modified when starting the Client IMS. 
Moreover, we could think about the reaction of the different entities when one’s identity is 
not verified: should the entity send an error message or not, in case someone was trying to 
launch  a  Denial  of  Service  attack  for  example.  Maybe  an  alternative  solution  could  be  to  
limit the amount of error messages per identity. 
 We also could make the sources’ use more dynamic: for the configuration of the Client 
(like to indicate the localization of the Public and Private Keys, the algorithm used to 
calculate the HIT, the name of the domain operator), it would be nicer to add them in the 
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file Configurator.xml which defines all the configuration of the IMS client rather than 
letting them defined in java classes. 
We could also think about the way we generated and saved the cryptographic keys in 
the IMS Clients and in the S-CSCFs. For the moment, there are saved in files that the 
programs can read. A better solution for the application server would be to save this 
information in the HSS database. In this case it would enable to save many identities.  
Moreover, the distribution of these keys can also be studied. In the solution we 
presented in this work, they are pre-saved at the user and server code source directory. This 
scenario can be realistic as it would look like the one used for the shared secret between a 
phone user and his operator which is already saved in the SIM card of the user before he 
buys the phone. But we could also imagine a scenario where the cryptographic Keys 
distribution would be dynamically realized every time a SIP user wants to call another SIP 
user.  
Simulate a real roaming of a user in a visited network could be envisaged, but seems to 
be a little bit complicated to implement. Indeed, this implicates a lot of programming to 
realize the roaming, and all the carried signaling. Nevertheless, implementing this scenario 
could be really interesting for the future of this project. It would enable us to have a better 
vision of its realistic characteristics. 
5.5 Future work recommendations 
Even  though  in  this  work  we  haven’t  exchanged  any  HIP  specific  information,  there  are  
some similarities to its use. The work can be improved in the future by implementing a real 
HIP identity association through a four way handshake mechanism as presented in the 
Figure 5-9. 
The simple difference might be that in this case there will be no I1 message and the user 
A will start the handshake by sending in a HIP packet the message R1 which is meant to be 
a SIP “INVITE” message containing the identity and keying information of that user. Then 
the exchange will follow as a typical HIP handshake. No puzzle scheme is needed because 
it is supposed that the sender is known by the signaling network by being registered with 
the home operator using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure. 
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Figure 5-9. HIP handshake [9] 
Another direction for future work can be the usage of a certificate. With the presented 
mechanisms, the identity and the other keying information are in the body section of the 
message. There can be another way of including them in a kind of certificate. This solution 
authorizes another network element to take care of the HIP negotiation as presented in [39] 
and then explained more in detail in [9]. 
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6 Conclusions 
During this master thesis we have accomplished several tasks that were set as objectives at 
the very beginning of the work. We succeed in installing and configuring two IMS 
platforms and integrate IMS clients on them. At the same time we implemented an AS on 
which we deployed the SIP Servlet application. The main purpose of the work was to 
implement a secure identity exchange based on the IMS architecture. For this, we modified 
the IMS client code by developing new classes and methods in order to calculate and then 
add  the  identity  and  the  signature  of  the  client  and  also  to  verify  those  of  the  SIP  server.  
The same functionalities have been developed for the S-CSCF to assert its identity to its 
own users using the trust established by the roaming agreement. 
The identity that we added as a new header (hash of the SIP entity public key) on the 
SIP messages is similar to HIT. Even though this identity is based on the HIT 
representation it is not exactly the same as HIT in a typical HIP exchange. In this work we 
haven’t implemented HIP specific exchange, but just the assured identity exchange.  
All this work relies on the fact that the trust between two end SIP entities is based on 
the existing trust relationship between the operators. In addition, every entity is in 
possession of a secure cryptographic identifier.  One of the prerequisites of this work is that 
the IMS user has already registered previously with the home operator and has 
communicated his identity to its operator. At the same time the operators have 
communicated  their  identity  to  the  users.  In  this  case,  the  operator  can  check  the  
correspondence of the identities and once those identities verified it can add its own 
identity. As the IMS users trust their own home operators and as the operators trust each 
other based on the pre-established agreement, the end users can be sure about the identity of 
their counterparts.  
The mechanisms presented on this work have been evaluated according to their 
scalability aspects. We have analyzed the SIP messages containing the new headers. This 
has shown that the total size of the SIP message does not overpass the maximum size of the 
UDP datagram. The result of this work is that the high level architecture presented in order 
to enhance the security aspects of multimedia communications based on IMS architecture 
and SIP exchange is implementable. Nevertheless some scalability aspects such the size of 
the new SIP packets and the time delay has to be taken into account.  
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Appendix A: Configuring virtual interfaces on “/etc/network/interfaces” 
auto lo 
iface lo inet loopback 
 
auto lo:1 
iface lo:1 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.101 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
auto lo:2 
iface lo:2 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.102 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
auto lo:3 
iface lo:3 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.103 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
auto lo:4 
iface lo:4 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.104 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
auto lo:5 
iface lo:5 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.105 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
auto lo:6 
iface lo:6 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.106 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
auto lo:7 
iface lo:7 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.107 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
auto lo:8 
iface lo:8 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.108 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
auto lo:9 
iface lo:9 inet static 
    address 10.1.22.109 
    netmask 255.255.255.0 
 
iface eth0 inet dhcp 
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Appendix B: DNS zone configuration file /etc/bind/open-ims.dnszone 
$ORIGIN open-ims.test. 
$TTL 1W 
@                       1D IN SOA       localhost. root.localhost. ( 
                                        2006101001      ; serial 
                                        3H              ; refresh 
                                        15M             ; retry 
                                        1W              ; expiry 
                                        1D )            ; minimum 
 
                        1D IN NS        ns 
ns                      1D IN A         10.1.22.103 
 
dns                     1D IN A         10.1.22.101 
 
pcscf                   1D IN A         10.1.22.102 
_sip.pcscf              1D SRV 0 0 4060 pcscf 
_sip._udp.pcscf         1D SRV 0 0 4060 pcscf 
_sip._tcp.pcscf         1D SRV 0 0 4060 pcscf 
 
icscf                   1D IN A         10.1.22.103 
_sip                    1D SRV 0 0 5060 icscf 
_sip._udp               1D SRV 0 0 5060 icscf 
_sip._tcp               1D SRV 0 0 5060 icscf 
 
open-ims.test.          1D IN A         10.1.22.103 
open-ims.test.          1D IN NAPTR 10 50 "s" "SIP+D2U" ""      _sip._udp 
open-ims.test.          1D IN NAPTR 20 50 "s" "SIP+D2T" ""      _sip._tcp 
 
scscf                   1D IN A         10.1.22.104 
_sip.scscf              1D SRV 0 0 6060 scscf 
_sip._udp.scscf         1D SRV 0 0 6060 scscf 
_sip._tcp.scscf         1D SRV 0 0 6060 scscf 
imsCommA                1D IN A         10.1.22.106 
_sip.imsCommA           1D SRV 0 0 5070 imsCommA 
_sip._udp.imsCommA      1D SRV 0 0 5070 imsCommA 
_sip._tcp.imsCommA      1D SRV 0 0 5070 imsCommA 
 
imsCommB                1D IN A         10.1.22.107 
_sip.imsCommB           1D SRV 0 0 5080 imsCommB 
_sip._udp.imsCommB      1D SRV 0 0 5080 imsCommB 
_sip._tcp.imsCommB      1D SRV 0 0 5080 imsCommB 
 
trcf                    1D IN A         127.0.0.1 
_sip.trcf               1D SRV 0 0 3060 trcf 
_sip._udp.trcf          1D SRV 0 0 3060 trcf 
_sip._tcp.trcf          1D SRV 0 0 3060 trcf 
 
bgcf                    1D IN A         127.0.0.1 
_sip.bgcf               1D SRV 0 0 7060 bgcf 
92 
 
_sip._udp.bgcf          1D SRV 0 0 7060 bgcf 
_sip._tcp.bgcf          1D SRV 0 0 7060 bgcf 
 
mgcf                    1D IN A         127.0.0.1 
_sip.mgcf               1D SRV 0 0 8060 mgcf 
_sip._udp.mgcf          1D SRV 0 0 8060 mgcf 
_sip._tcp.mgcf          1D SRV 0 0 8060 mgcf 
 
hss                     1D IN A         10.1.22.105 
 
sailfin                 1D IN A         10.1.22.109 
 
pcrf                    1D IN A                 127.0.0.1 
clf                     1D IN A                 127.0.0.1 
Appendix C: Functionning of IMS Communicator 
Using Wireshark, we could launch a simulation and follow the different messages 
exchanged  by  the  different  entities.  In  this  simulation,  we  have  one  IMS  Client  that  is  
performing a registration to his home operator. The message flow is shown in the Figure 
8-1. In this one, the addresses of the different entities are: 
x IMS Client: 10.1.22.101 
x P-CSCF : 10.1.22.102 
x I-CSCF : 10.1.22.103  
x S-CSCF :10.1.22.104 
Figure 8-1. REGISTER Call Flow 
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This Figure can be understood by reading it step by step: 
10.1.22.101 -> 10.1.22.102: SIP. Request “REGISTER” (1) 
The request “REGISTER” created by the user is first sent to the P-CSCF (the proxy is 
always  the  first  point  of  contact  of  the  user).  This  message  contains  the  IMS  Client  SIP  
identity.  
10.1.22.102 -> 10.1.22.103: SIP. Request “REGISTER” (1) 
The proxy just forwards it to the interrogating server to check the user’s identity.  
10.1.22.103 -> 10.1.22.104: SIP. Request “REGISTER” (1) 
After interrogating the database HSS, the I-CSCF forwards the request to the S-CSCF 
associated to the user. 
10.1.22.104 -> 10.1.22.103: SIP. Status “401 Unauthorized” 
The S-CSCF sends a message “401 Unauthorized” containing a challenge to the I-
CSCF. This challenge aims at authenticating the user, by providing a puzzle that he is the 
only one able to solve. 
10.1.22.103-> 10.1.22.102-> 10.1.22.101:SIP. Status “401 Unauthorized” 
The message is forwarded to the client IMS by the Interrogating and Proxy SIP Servers. 
10.1.22.101 -> 10.1.22.102: SIP. Request “REGISTER” (2) 
When receiving this message, the user resolves the challenge using his password 
(shared with the server), generates the answer (The second sequence of the request 
REGISTER) and sends it to the proxy. 
10.1.22.102 -> 10.1.22.103 -> 10.1.22.104: SIP. Request “REGISTER” (2) 
This message is then forwarded to the server by the SIP Servers which can check if the 
user answered the good response to the challenge, which would prove that he has the 
password, and so, that he is who he pretended to be. The S-CSCF generates so a “200 OK” 
message, which is forwarded to the user to warn him that he is well registered. 
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Appendix D: NIST-SIP: The Reference Implementation for JAIN-SIP 
1.2 
The objective of this specification is to develop a standard interface to SIP that can be used 
independently or by higher level programming entities and environments. This 
specification was designed to provide a developer with a standardized interface for SIP 
services which are functionally compatible with the RFC 3261 [12]. This specification is a 
general purpose transaction based Java interface to the SIP protocol. It is rich both 
semantically and in definition to the SIP protocol. Some useful packages proposed by Nist-
Sip are presented in the Figure 8-2. 
 
In the project, we used several objects and methods proposed by these packages. 
Actually, they were especially created and used for the IMS Client that we used (by Jose 
Miguel Freitas). More information can be found in [40]. 
Appendix E: Testing the project 
To test the project files, we first have to install the platform Open Source IMS Core and the 
tools (procedures described in the section 3). Then, you need to configure the folders 
containing the IMS Clients (/ims-communicator) and the application server (/sailfin) in 
the place of your choice. In the Appendix F, an example of script that can be used is 
presented. You first need to adapt it to your configuration to indicate the location of all the 
elements, and save it as “script.sh” for example. It can be noted that if you want to test a 
configuration with two users (Bob and Alice), you need to create two folders containing the 
Figure 8-2. Some useful packages proposed by Nist-Sip [40] 
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same code (“/ims-communicator6” and “/ims-communicator7” in the example), and 
then follow the procedure described in the Appendix G to configure the user as Bob or as 
Alice. 
The script enables to easily launch the environment and the different elements. It’s 
recommended to open several Consoles (or different instances in Putty Connection 
Manager) which are going to contain all the different elements. To do so, you first need to 
be “Root” in your Console, and then launch the script: 
#>sudo bash  
#>sh script.sh 
Then, the script is launched and it writes all the possibilities that you have:  
"*****Commands available : init, restart_as, p, i, s, hss, as, as_log, 
as_log_vi bob, bob_run, bob_log, alice, alice_run, alice_log, 
quit*****" 
 
In a first window, you can start the environment (it restarts DNS, MySQL and Sailfin): 
Init 
Then, in each of the 6 consoles, you launch the different servers: p-cscf, i-cscf, s-cscf, hss. 
So first, you need to launch the script in each console:  
sh script.sh 
In the first console, you need to write : 
P 
Then, in the second one: 
I 
Then in the other consoles:  
s, hss. 
To be sure that the environment is working, you can read the numerous logs appearing 
in the SIP servers windows. The I-CSCF and S-CSCF must show [Open] connections, this 
means that they are dialoging with the HSS, waiting for users to register themselves. Before 
launching the users, you can run Wireshark, so that you will be able to analyze the traffic. 
More information about the configuration of Wireshark can be found in the section 3.4.1. 
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Then, you can launch the two users Bob and Alice. For each of them, there are several 
options when you choose “bob” or “alice”. We recommend to first rebuild and then 
execute. For example, for Bob: 
#>sh script.sh 
Bob 
Bob_rebuild 
If the rebuild returns a “BUILD SUCCESSFUL” (or else, correct the mistakes, it is 
probably a background element missing): 
#>sh script.sh 
Bob 
Bob_run 
When this command is launched, a window opens representing the IMS Client. This 
one is shown in the Figure 8-3. The next step is to REGISTER the user, as shown in the 
Figure 8-4 and Figure 8-4 (Bob’s password is “bob”; Alice’s password is “alice”). 
 
 
Figure 8-3. Client not registered 
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Figure 8-4. Procedure to register the user 
 
 
Figure 8-5. Registration box 
 
Then, when another client “Alice” is registered, we can try to call her: as represented in 
the Figure 8-6, Bob has entered the Alice’s sip address and has pushed the button “Dial”. 
 
Figure 8-6. Bob calls Alice 
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Alice can see the incoming call, and can decide to accept it by pushing “Answer”. Then 
when the connection is established, the status is turned to “Connected” as shown in the 
Figure 8-7.  
 
Figure 8-7. Bob and Alice connected 
We can follow in Wireshark the different messages exchanged presented in the Section 5. 
Appendix F: Script Shell: script.sh 
#!/bin/bash 
echo "" 
echo "" 
echo "*****Commands available : init, restart_as, p, i, s, hss, as, 
as_log, as_log_vi bob, bob_run, bob_log, alice, alice_run, alice_log, 
quit*****" 
read a 
case $a in 
init) 
/etc/init.d/bind9 restart; 
cd /etc/init.d/; 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin start-domain domain1; 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin start-database; 
mysql -p; 
echo "*****DNS, MySQL and Sailfin launched*****" 
;; 
  
quit) 
/etc/init.d/bind9 stop; 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin stop-domain domain1; 
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/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin stop-database; 
echo "*****DNS and AS servers stopped *****";; 
 
restart_as) 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin stop-domain domain1; 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin stop-database; 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin start-domain domain1; 
/home/hay/sailfin/bin/asadmin start-database 
;; 
 
p) 
cd /opt/OpenIMSCore; 
sh pcscf.sh; 
echo "*****P-CSCF launched*****" 
;; 
 
i) 
cd /opt/OpenIMSCore; 
sh icscf.sh; 
echo "*****I-CSCF launched*****" 
;; 
 
s) 
cd /opt/OpenIMSCore; 
sh scscf.sh; 
echo "*****I-CSCF launched*****" 
;; 
 
hss) 
cd /opt/OpenIMSCore/FHoSS/deploy; 
sh startup.sh; 
echo "*****HSS launched*****" 
;; 
 
as) 
cd sailfin/samples/sipservlet/Identity; 
ant all; 
;; 
 
as_log) 
gedit sailfin/domains/domain1/logs/server.log trunk/ims-
communicator4/log/ims-communicator.app.log;; 
 
as_log_vi) 
vim sailfin/domains/domain1/logs/server.log;; 
  
bob) 
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cd /home/hay/trunk/ims-communicator6/; 
echo ""    
echo "***** Client IMS-Communicator 6 (bob)*****"; 
echo "***** Choice : clean, make, rebuild, run-project, run, all 
*****"; 
read b ; 
case $b in 
clean) 
 ant clean;; 
 
 make) 
 ant make;; 
 
 rebuild) 
 ant rebuild;; 
  
run-project) 
 ant run-project;; 
 
run) 
ant run;; 
  
all) 
ant all;; 
esac;; 
 
bob_run) 
cd /home/hay/trunk/ims-communicator6/; 
ant run;; 
 
bob_log) 
cd /home/hay/trunk/ims-communicator6/log; 
gedit ims-communicator.app.log ims-communicator.debug.log ims-
communicator.stack.log 
;; 
 
alice) 
cd /home/hay/trunk/ims-communicator7; 
echo ""    
echo "***** Client IMS-Communicator 7 (alice)*****"; 
echo "***** Choice : clean, make, rebuild, run-project, run, all 
*****"; 
read b ; 
case $b in 
clean) 
ant clean;; 
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make) 
ant make;; 
 
rebuild) 
ant rebuild;; 
  
run-project) 
ant run-project;; 
 
run) 
ant run;; 
 
all) 
ant all;; 
esac;; 
 
alice_run) 
cd /home/hay/trunk/ims-communicator7; 
ant run;; 
 
alice_log) 
cd /home/hay/trunk/ims-communicator7/log; 
gedit ims-communicator.app.log ims-communicator.debug.log ims-
communicator.stack.log 
  
esac 
Appendix G: Configure the folder ims-communicator as “Bob” or as 
“Alice” 
Some modifications need to be done to configure the project as a “bob” or “alice” profile. 
Bob and Alice differ from their sip addresses, the cryptographic keys that they have, and 
the server that they trust (if they belong to different domains). So, the next steps are going 
to describe how to change these values. 
First, we need to open the file “ims-communicator.xml”. This file contains all the 
configuration of the user. Some fields need to be adapted to Bob or to Alice profile as 
described in the Section 3.2.3. 
Then,  we  need  to  put  the  correct  keys  in  the  folder  “/ims-communicator”. In the 
Figure 8-8, we show the example of a user configured as “bob”. We can see that he has his 
private key and his public key, and also his home operator’s public key 
(“public_key_file_serverB”). 
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Figure 8-8. Ims-communicator folder 
Finally, some modifications need to be done in the file 
“src/net/java/sip/communicator/sip/security/Security_ims_project_tools.ja
va”. They represent the algorithm used by the user and his home 
operator’s name: 
private String algorithm ="SHA-1"; 
private String name_server = "homeB"; 
Some other modifications have also to be done in the file 
“src/net/java/sip/communicator/sip/CallProcessing.java”. These different 
values represent the names of the files containing the keys presented in the Figure 8-8: 
private String private_key_file_client="private_key_file_bob"; 
private String public_key_file_client="public_key_file_bob"; 
private String public_key_file_server="public_key_file_serverB"; 
